base_parts_ai@1.0.59
jaskle base_parts_ai
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no automatic npm lifecycle hook, but its explicit Codex setup command writes remotely fetched text to the global `AGENTS.md` instruction file. That leaves a concrete agent-configuration risk without source evidence of malicious content, so a warning is appropriate.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest defines a nonstandard `__postinstall` script, not an automatic npm lifecycle hook.
- The `jcx setapi` command invokes the Codex configuration workflow when run by the user.
- That workflow fetches remote text and writes it to the configured `AGENTS.md` path, which is `~/.codex/AGENTS.md`.
- The remote text is fetched from the package’s configured `jai.jaskle.cn` endpoint.
- The `ucx.js` target only checks whether a directory is named `.codex` or begins with `.codex_`; it does not mutate agent instructions.
- The package also configures Claude’s `settings.json` path under the user’s `.claude` directory.
- The remote `AGENTS.md` write is reached through an explicit configuration command, not an install hook.
- The source inspected does not establish that the fetched content is malicious or that credentials are sent to the endpoint.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceRuntime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.
bin/jcx.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to base_parts_ai@1.0.59.
See all versions of base_parts_ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of base_parts_ai@1.0.59 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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