base_parts_ai@1.0.62
jaskle base_parts_ai
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection found an automatic, server-directed global self-update on CLI use with no effective confirmation prompt. This is a real unresolved risk, but the inspected source does not prove a broader attack chain or establish the payload behavior, so a warning is appropriate.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines no standard install lifecycle hook; the configuration fetch and update are reached through CLI commands.
- lib/ai_utils.js fetches version data from jai.jaskle.cn during CLI configuration.
- When the returned version is newer, lib/ai_utils.js installs a tarball from jdwfiles.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com globally and reruns the CLI; the confirmation prompt is commented out and the decision is hardcoded to yes.
- bin/jcx.js and lib/claude_cli_common.js call fetchConfig as part of their command flows, so invoking these CLIs can trigger the update.
- No standard preinstall, install, or postinstall hook is defined in package.json.
- The update check is reached through CLI invocation, and the inspected source does not establish credential theft, destructive behavior, or a separate agent-control-surface attack.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceRuntime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.
bin/jcx.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to base_parts_ai@1.0.62.
See all versions of base_parts_ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of base_parts_ai@1.0.62 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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