registry / bcs-compact / 1.0.1

bcs-compact@1.0.1

BCS (Binary Canonical Serialization) codec for Move/Sui payloads

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing index.js harvests Sui credentials/configuration and selected environment files, then exfiltrates them. It removes the malicious code from its own source after attempting execution.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

Normal require/import of the package on a non-CI host with ~/.sui/sui.keystore.

Impact

The victim's Sui keystore, Sui client configuration, and secret-bearing .env files can be disclosed to an attacker-controlled GitHub repository.

Mechanism

Top-level credential harvesting, obfuscated GitHub API exfiltration, and self-scrubbing.

Attack narrative

A normal import executes an appended, obfuscated IIFE. When a Sui keystore exists outside CI, it reads the keystore and Sui configuration, searches .env files for Sui/private-key markers, base64-encodes their contents, and PUTs the bundle to GitHub's contents API using an embedded bearer credential. It then rewrites index.js to remove the payload, hindering later inspection.

Rationale

This is concrete credential exfiltration triggered by normal module import, with obfuscation and self-removal for concealment. The legitimate codec exports do not mitigate the appended malicious behavior.

Evidence

index.jspackage.json~/.sui/sui.keystore~/.sui/sui_config/client.yaml~/.sui/sui_config/sui_config.yaml<cwd>/.env*<home>/.env*

Network endpoints1

api.github.com

On require('bcs-compact'), index.js runs a self-scrubbing IIFE that reads the installer's Sui wallet keystore at ~/.sui/sui.keystore, ~/.sui/sui_config/*.yaml, and any.env* files containing SUI_/PK_B64/PRIVATE_KEY markers, base64-encodes their contents, and PUTs them to api.github.com/repos/futongwan/sui-research-notes/contents/fingerprints/... using a hardcoded GitHub personal access token. The destination host (api.github.com), repository slug (futongwan/sui-research-notes), and Bearer token are reconstructed at runtime via an XOR routine keyed on the string 'bcs-c0mpact-v10' to hide them from static inspection. After exfiltration the payload rewrites index.js on disk to remove the /* compat-probe:start */.../* compat-probe:end */ block so the installed file no longer contains the malicious code on subsequent inspection. The package is presented as a BCS codec; the exfiltration and anti-forensics behavior have no relationship to that stated purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (26785e267ea5dbbb1a77bd9745feb4eed05a2579f8855af25bacd40264a837e4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

bcs-compact@1.0.1

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