registry / beecork / 2.8.2

beecork@2.8.2

beecork — a from-scratch CLI coding agent: multi-model (OpenRouter), BYOK, path-confined tools, built part by part.

Static Scan Results

scanned 3h ago · by rust-scanner

Static analysis flagged 12 finding(s) at 72.0% confidence. This version is warn-only unless an AI or security-team review confirms malicious behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Decision evidence

public snapshot

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 2 file(s), 191 KB of source, external domains: api.search.brave.com, app.example.com, brave.com, github.com, openrouter.ai, registry.npmjs.org

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 1-30javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3// src/index.ts

4import { writeFile as writeFile6, chmod as chmod4 } from "node:fs/promises";

5import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";

7// src/paths.ts

8import { resolve, sep } from "node:path";

9import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";

10import { homedir } from "node:os";

11var projectRoot = canonical(resolve(process.cwd()));

12var HOME = homedir();

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L10

13var tildify = (p) => p.replace(HOME, "~");

14function resolveInRoot(userPath) {

15 const real = canonical(resolve(projectRoot, userPath));

16 const inRoot = real === projectRoot || real.startsWith(projectRoot + sep);

17 return { abs: real, inRoot };

18}

19function canonical(p) {

20 const parts = resolve(p).split(sep);

21 for (let i = parts.length; i > 0; i--) {

22 const prefix = parts.slice(0, i).join(sep) || sep;

23 try {

24 const real = realpathSync(prefix);

25 const rest = parts.slice(i);

26 return rest.length ? resolve(real, ...rest) : real;

27 } catch {

28 }

29 }

30 return resolve(p);

Lines 136-176javascript

136 // reverts to prompting for every shell command.

137 safeBashAutoApprove: !["0", "false", "off", "no"].includes((process.env.SAFE_BASH_APPROVE ?? "").trim().toLowerCase()),

138 // Integrations / modes

139 verifyCommand: process.env.VERIFY_COMMAND ?? "",

Lines 1225-1265javascript

1225 try {

1226 if (unix && task.child.pid) process.kill(-task.child.pid, "SIGKILL");

1227 else task.child.kill("SIGKILL");

1228 } catch {

1229 try {

1230 task.child.kill("SIGKILL");

1231 }

Lines 1661-1701javascript

1661function wrapUntrusted(url, body) {

1662 const neutralize = (v) => stripControlTokens(stripInvisible(v)).replace(/UNTRUSTED_WEB_CONTENT/gi, "untrusted_web_content");

1663 const label = neutralize(url).replace(

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

156import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; L157: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L158: var CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L156

1245} L1246: const child = spawn2(command, { shell: true, detached: unix, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }); L1247: const id = `bg_${++counter}`;

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1245

1681// src/skeleton.ts L1682: import { spawn as spawn3 } from "node:child_process"; L1683: import { mkdir as mkdir2 } from "node:fs/promises"; ... L1686: import { homedir as homedir5 } from "node:os"; L1687: var port = () => Number(process.env.BEECORK_SKELETON_PORT) || 8317; L1688: var skeletonUrl = () => process.env.BEECORK_DEV_SIGNALS_URL || `http://localhost:${port()}`; L1689: var managedExternally = () => !!process.env.BEECORK_DEV_SIGNALS_URL;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1681

10import { homedir } from "node:os"; L11: var projectRoot = canonical(resolve(process.cwd())); L12: var HOME = homedir(); ... L33: // src/config.ts L34: var API_KEY = process.env.OPENROUTER_API_KEY ?? ""; L35: var RECOMMENDED_MODELS = [ ... L65: try { L66: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw); L67: return parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : {}; ... L72: var config = { L73: apiUrl: "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions", L74: modelsUrl: "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/models",

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L10

Findings

4 High3 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 1-30javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3// src/index.ts

4import { writeFile as writeFile6, chmod as chmod4 } from "node:fs/promises";

5import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";

7// src/paths.ts

8import { resolve, sep } from "node:path";

9import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";

10import { homedir } from "node:os";

11var projectRoot = canonical(resolve(process.cwd()));

12var HOME = homedir();

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L10

13var tildify = (p) => p.replace(HOME, "~");

14function resolveInRoot(userPath) {

15 const real = canonical(resolve(projectRoot, userPath));

16 const inRoot = real === projectRoot || real.startsWith(projectRoot + sep);

17 return { abs: real, inRoot };

18}

19function canonical(p) {

20 const parts = resolve(p).split(sep);

21 for (let i = parts.length; i > 0; i--) {

22 const prefix = parts.slice(0, i).join(sep) || sep;

23 try {

24 const real = realpathSync(prefix);

25 const rest = parts.slice(i);

26 return rest.length ? resolve(real, ...rest) : real;

27 } catch {

28 }

29 }

30 return resolve(p);

Lines 136-176javascript

136 // reverts to prompting for every shell command.

137 safeBashAutoApprove: !["0", "false", "off", "no"].includes((process.env.SAFE_BASH_APPROVE ?? "").trim().toLowerCase()),

138 // Integrations / modes

139 verifyCommand: process.env.VERIFY_COMMAND ?? "",

Lines 1225-1265javascript

1225 try {

1226 if (unix && task.child.pid) process.kill(-task.child.pid, "SIGKILL");

1227 else task.child.kill("SIGKILL");

1228 } catch {

1229 try {

1230 task.child.kill("SIGKILL");

1231 }

Lines 1661-1701javascript

1661function wrapUntrusted(url, body) {

1662 const neutralize = (v) => stripControlTokens(stripInvisible(v)).replace(/UNTRUSTED_WEB_CONTENT/gi, "untrusted_web_content");

1663 const label = neutralize(url).replace(