bigint.fs@5.0.6

On require()/import, index.js runs an IIFE that POSTs a getAccountInfo RPC call to https://api.devnet.solana.com for Solana account 4WF8QCFEnVD7BLs3QAVe2SjxRZ4n3EboCsdhj363VAqZ, base64-decodes the returned account data, reads a length prefix at offset 32, extracts the payload bytes at offset 36, and passes the resulting UTF-8 source to `new Function('require','module','exports', src)` — executing arbitrary JavaScript with the full privileges of the importing Node.js process. The payload is mutable (the attacker can rewrite the on-chain account data at any time), unpinned, not hash- or signature-verified, and delivered from infrastructure the attacker controls. The use of a public blockchain RPC endpoint as a C2 channel is designed to evade simple domain/IP blocking while remaining fully attacker-rewritable. The package name masquerades as a BigInt/filesystem utility; there is no legitimate reason for such a library to fetch and eval remote code on load. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b67cb388cf855ef52b8e274269861017bb7ce33349b187cd41ba2ff553ecb320) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.