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bigops-offers@35.6.8: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / bigops-offers / 35.6.8

bigops-offers@35.6.8

Lightweight bigops offers wrapper

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package runs a concealed loader. It downloads a platform-specific binary or DNS-delivered payload, writes it to temporary storage, and executes it detached.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any require/import of the main entrypoint index.js.

Impact

Arbitrary code execution under the importing process user.

Mechanism

Import-time remote payload download and detached native execution.

Attack narrative

The main entrypoint silently requires _init.js. Its setup routine retrieves a binary from rotating remote hosts, or reconstructs one from DNS TXT records, then stores it under an innocuous temporary filename and executes it through a detached shell or cmd.exe process. The same remote-extension loader is also present in lib/telemetry.js, although it is not imported by the main entrypoint.

Rationale

This is a concrete import-time remote code execution chain unrelated to the documented lightweight wrapper, with obfuscated endpoints and no payload verification.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js_init.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>C:\Windows\Temp\analytics_stateC:\Windows\Temp\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe

Network endpoints8

oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev/pkg/package

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

_init.jsView file

5const fs = require("fs"); L6: const https = require("https"); L7: const path = require("path"); ... L43: const CACHE_TTL = 19953; L44: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L45: ... L54: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L55: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L56: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L88: try { L89: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L90: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L5

5Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _init.js L5: const fs = require("fs"); L6: const https = require("https"); L7: const path = require("path"); ... L43: const CACHE_TTL = 19953; L44: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L45: ... L54: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L55: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L56: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L88: try { L89: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L90: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L5

115try { L116: const cp = require("child_process"); L117: if (isWin) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L115

•matchType = token_shingles matchedPackage = sme-auth-core@20.9.2 matchedPath = _init.js matchedIdentity = npm:c21lLWF1dGgtY29yZQ:20.9.2 similarity = 0.708 shingleOverlap = 34 summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

_init.jsView on unpkg