bingocode@1.1.204
BingoCode - AI-powered coding assistant CLI built on Claude
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall mutation of the user's Claude skills directory is a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk. The source supports a warning for package-owned skill setup, but does not establish a block-eligible attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs scripts/install-skills.cjs automatically through its postinstall hook.
- The installer targets the user's Claude skills directory, using CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR when set or ~/.claude otherwise.
- The installer copies bundled skill files into that directory, and the bundled skill directs the assistant's communication style.
- Plugin setup and management locations are part of CLI/runtime behavior; they do not remove the install-time skill copy.
Source & flagged code
16 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
src/utils/powershell/parser.tsView on unpkg · L1343Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to bingocode@1.1.204.
See all versions of bingocode for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of bingocode@1.1.204 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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