blogger-publisher@1.3.3
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no lifecycle execution, remote payload loading, shell execution, or unconsented foreign agent-control mutation. The explicit AI-agent scaffolding and bundled populated OAuth configuration create a real security concern.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `.env` contains populated OAuth-related configuration values, including a refresh-token-length value.
- `lib/tui.js` copies package `AGENT.md` into the caller's project during explicit interactive `init`.
- `AGENT.md` instructs AI agents to use this package's publishing and MCP capabilities.
- `lib/mcp/tools/posts.js`, `pages.js`, and `comments.js` expose authenticated create/update/delete operations.
- `package.json` has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare lifecycle hook.
- Entrypoints only run through declared CLI/MCP binaries; no import-time payload execution was found.
- Network calls are package-aligned: Blogger/Drive image publishing, selected image CDNs, GitHub uploads, and npm update checks.
- No child-process, eval/vm, dynamic code loading, native binaries, or credential-exfiltration path was found.
- Image uploads read explicitly referenced local image files; publisher blocks image paths outside the working directory.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourceSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
lib/uploaders/github.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to blogger-publisher@1.3.3.
See all versions of blogger-publisher for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of blogger-publisher@1.3.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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