bloom-player@2.20.1
A library for displaying Bloom books in iframes or WebViews
AI Security Review
scanned 4mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection shows a browser-oriented Bloom player with audio/activity assets and bundled frontend libraries, with no install-time execution, shell/native loading, credential harvesting, or AI-agent control-surface mutation. Scanner hits map to benign bundled code, valid media assets, and package-aligned browser resource loading.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has no lifecycle scripts or bin; export is lib/shared.es.js.
- src/shared/narration.ts only creates/loads audio elements from urlPrefix()/audio/<id>.mp3 for Bloom playback.
- src/shared/dragActivityRuntime.ts uses bundled MP3 defaults and page attributes for activity sounds; no shell or filesystem APIs.
- Bidi/invisible Unicode scan over package source returned no matches despite scanner hint.
- MP3 files are valid MPEG audio assets, not executable payloads.
- Network URLs in dist are Bloom/player docs, fonts, analytics, and bundled library references; no credential harvesting or exfiltration code found.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedSource contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.
dist/bloomPlayer.CzxSC7ao.jsView on unpkg · L27Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/bloomPlayer.CzxSC7ao.jsView on unpkg · L7881Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to bloom-player@2.20.1.
See all versions of bloom-player for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of bloom-player@2.20.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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