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botmux@3.18.0: Agent extension lifecycle risk – flagged | LPM Firewall
Flagged as agent extension risk
Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.
AI security reviewscanned on Sep 17, 2026, 01:14 UTC · by lpm-firewall-ai Inspected source shows a first-party IM-to-CLI product: postinstall only plants a global HOME launcher, while daemon and dashboard startup write botmux hooks into Claude and Codex configs. That is first-party agent-extension setup plus dual-use shell installs, not an unconsented npm install hijack, but the tree is too large for a clean all-clear.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
npm install -g botmux writes the launcher; starting the botmux daemon or dashboard installs AI CLI hooks.
Impact
Other AI CLIs on the same account can start executing botmux hook commands, and Linux font setup may run apt-get as root or passwordless sudo.
Mechanism
First-party HOME launcher plus runtime writes into foreign AI CLI hook configs
Evidence
package.json scripts/postinstall-bin.mjs dist/daemon.js dist/adapters/hook-installer.js dist/adapters/cli/claude-code.js dist/features/codex-notifier/hook-installer.js dist/dashboard.js dist/utils/font-installer.js ~/.botmux/bin/botmux
~/.claude/settings.json
~/.codex/hooks.json
Network endpoints3
open.feishu.cn open.larksuite.com mira.bytedance.com
Decision evidencepublic snapshot Evidence for warning
Global npm postinstall writes a HOME launcher at ~/.botmux/bin/botmux. Starting the daemon auto-installs botmux hooks into other AI CLI configs so adopted Claude sessions pick them up. The hook installer merges botmux command hooks into Claude-family settings.json and related plugin formats. The dashboard can write Codex Stop and UserPromptSubmit hooks into ~/.codex/hooks.json when the notifier is enabled. Runtime font setup can spawn apt-get or passwordless sudo apt-get on Linux. The published dist tree is too large for complete static coverage, so leftover dual-use shell and agent-control paths cannot be fully ruled out. Evidence against
postinstall exits immediately unless npm_config_global is exactly true and skips source checkouts. Agent-hook writes run after the user starts the daemon or dashboard, not during npm postinstall. Inspected hook, launcher, and installer code matches the stated IM-to-CLI bridge product. There is no runtime dependency on the package name botmux; optional deps are same-version platform binaries. No hidden exfil hosts such as webhook.site were found in source search. Behavioral surface
Source Child process · Crypto · Dynamic require · Environment variables · Eval · Filesystem · Network · Shell · Web socket
Supply chain High entropy strings · Minified · Possible obfuscation · URL strings
Manifest No manifest risk signals triggered.
Scanned 1,075 files · 18.9 MB of source
30 external domains referenced
10.0.0.5 10.1.2.3 127.0.0.1 accounts.feishu.cn accounts.larksuite.com api.github.com api.openai.com api.z.ai applink.feishu.cn applink.larksuite.com ask.feishu.cn botmux.example.com cdn.jsdelivr.net dashboard.invalid deepcoldy.github.io emscripten.org github.com herdr.dev lf-scm-cn.feishucdn.com mira.bytedance.com open.feishu.cn open.larksuite.com raw.githubusercontent.com react.dev registry.example.com registry.npmjs.org riff.example.com sami.bytedance.com www.apple.com www.w3.org Findings2 critical · 19 high · 5 medium · 7 low Source & flagged code24 flagged High Install time lifecycle scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.json View on unpkg Scanner record · 1 line scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall-bin.mjs
High Child process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/codex-rpc-engine.js View on unpkg · L23 Code excerpt · 3 lines 23 // what froze the Web terminal). See codex-rpc-lifecycle + worker engageCodexRpc.
24 import { spawn, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process' ;
25 import { createServer } from 'node:net' ;
Code excerpt · 3 lines 79 /** 在完整 Worker 模块加载前接住首条 IPC,避免冷启动耗时被误判为投递失败。 */
80 function workerForkExecArgv () {
81 const preloadPath = join (__dirname, '..' , 'worker-ipc-preload.js' );
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/core/worker-pool.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/core/worker-pool.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
Medium Dynamic require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/core/plugins/runtime.js View on unpkg · L90 Code excerpt · 3 lines 90 throw new Error (`plugin_service_entry_not_found:${record.id}:${entrypoint}` );
91 const mod = await import (pathToFileURL (entry).href);
92 const exported = mod.default ?? mod;
Low Weak crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/worker.js View on unpkg · L9 Code excerpt · 12 lines 9 * 3 . Spawns CLI via CliAdapter + PtyBackend (interactive mode)
10 * 4 . Starts HTTP + WebSocket server for xterm.js
11 * 5 . Receives 'message' events from daemon, writes to PTY stdin
⋯
20 import { homedir, tmpdir, userInfo } from 'node:os' ;
21 import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' ;
22 import { [redacted], credentialIsolationRequired, [redacted], [redacted], buildCredentialIsolationRules...
⋯
176 // this one covers any worker spawn path that bypasses it). Scrubbing
Medium Install persistence
Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/autostart.js View on unpkg · L16 Code excerpt · 12 lines 16 */
17 import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' ;
18 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs' ;
⋯
24 function platform () {
25 if (process.platform === 'darwin' )
26 return 'macos' ;
⋯
36 function plistPath () {
37 return join ( (), , , );
High Same file environment network execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/mira-runner.js View on unpkg · L1 Code excerpt · 7 lines 1 #!/usr/bin/env node
2 import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process' ;
3 import { existsSync } from 'node:fs' ;
⋯
8 import { RunnerControlWriter } from './adapters/cli/runner-control-channel.js' ;
9 const MIRA_DOMAIN = 'https://mira.bytedance.com' ;
10 const API_BASE_URL = process.env.MIRA_API_BASE_URL ?? `${MIRA_DOMAIN}/mira/api/v1` ;
11 const MODEL_METADATA_URL = process.env.MIRA_MODEL_METADATA_URL ?? `${MIRA_DOMAIN}/api/v1/model/metadata` ;
dist/setup/ensure-tmux.js#virtual:string-array:round1 View file Critical Download execute
Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.
dist/setup/ensure-tmux.js#virtual:string-array:round1 View on unpkg · L17 Critical Trigger reachable dangerous capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/setup/ensure-tmux.js#virtual:string-array:round1 View on unpkg · L17 Shared code excerpt · 2 findings · 9 lines 17 * threw on failure; that broke users whose tmux binary was present but
18 * couldn"t actually start a server (corrupt install / restricted /tmp /\n * broken ~/.tmux.conf — see daemon-error logs full of \"error connecting to\n * /tmp/tmux-UID/default\"), ...
19 * terminal tmux is gone (logged out, server killed, /tmp wiped) every
⋯
53 }
54 export function tmuxEnv(env = process.env) {
55 const rest = {};
⋯
209 }
dist/features/codex-notifier/hook-installer.js View file High Trigger reachable external AI agent control surface mutation
Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.
dist/features/codex-notifier/hook-installer.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 16 lines Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
import { accesssync, constants, existssync, mkdirsync, readfilesync } from 'node:fs';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { dirname, join, win32 } from 'node:path';
import { atomicwritefilesync } from '../../utils/atomic-write.js';
function shellword(value) {
if (/^[a-za-z0-9_./:@%+=,-]+$/.test(value))
return value;
return `'${value.replaceall("'", `'"'"'`)}'`;
}
export function codexhookspath(env = process.env, userhome = homedir()) {
const codexhome = typeof env.codex_home === 'string' && env.codex_home.trim()
? env.codex_home.trim()
dist/services/skill-registry-store.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View file High Runtime package install
Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
dist/services/skill-registry-store.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View on unpkg · L875 Code excerpt · 6 lines 875 // detached → own process group, so we can SIGKILL the WHOLE tree. The
876 // configured command is usually a shim (`npx agentbuddy@latest …`), so the
877 // real agentbuddy is a grandchild; killing only the direct child would
878 // leave it alive holding the pipes and polling the auth server.
879 child = spawn(bin, [...prefixArgs, ...args], { cwd, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"], detached: true });
880 }
dist/adapters/backend/mojo-types.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View file High Semantic analysis limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/adapters/backend/mojo-types.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View on unpkg Scanner record · 1 line stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 29
dist/adapters/backend/riff-backend.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/adapters/backend/riff-backend.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/adapters/backend/riff-backend.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/services/codex-app-threads.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/services/codex-app-threads.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/adapters/backend/sandbox.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/adapters/backend/sandbox.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
dist/adapters/backend/zellij-backend.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/adapters/backend/zellij-backend.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/adapters/backend/zellij-backend.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
dist/adapters/backend/zmx-backend.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/adapters/backend/zmx-backend.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/adapters/backend/zmx-backend.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/services/local-cli-opener.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/services/local-cli-opener.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
dist/services/skill-registry-store.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/services/skill-registry-store.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/services/sk[redacted]
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/utils/font-installer.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/utils/font-installer.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
dist/workflows/v3/distillation-runner.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/workflows/v3/distillation-runner.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/workflows/v3/distillation-runner.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
dist/adapters/backend/herdr-backend.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/adapters/backend/herdr-backend.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/adapters/backend/herdr-backend.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
dist/adapters/backend/mojo-backend.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/adapters/backend/mojo-backend.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = botmux@3.18.6
matchedPath = dist/adapters/backend/mojo-backend.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym90bXV4:3.18.6
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
Code↓
Package metadata 9 findings
Medium Network
Medium Environment variables
Medium Structural risk force deep review
Low Non install lifecycle scripts
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
177 // process.env — not just the spawned child's env — matters because worker-side
178 // resolvers consult it dynamically (codex submit confirmation / resume
723 headers: { 'content-type' : 'application/json' },
724 body: JSON.stringify ({
725 sessionId: cfg.sessionId,
homedir
'Library'
'LaunchAgents'
`${LABEL}.plist`
56 // tmux, etc.). Falls back to a sane default if PATH is empty.
57 const p = process.env.PATH || '' ;
210
/** Suggest the manual command we"d have run, for the failure message. */\nexport function suggestManualCommand(pm, pkg) {\n switch (pm) {\n case "brew": return `brew ins...
211 // present-but-broken tmux as "genuinely absent".
: join(userhome, '.codex');
return join(codexhome, 'hooks.json');
export function botmuxcodexnoti