--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/bumper-guard/v/0.2.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/bumper-guard/v/0.2.0.md" package: "bumper-guard" report_status: "published" title: "bumper-guard@0.2.0 npm security report" verdict: "policy_finding" version: "0.2.0" --- # bumper-guard@0.2.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. The package gains influence over agent tool approval across projects and continues running through login persistence. - **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding - **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 0.2.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installation automatically modifies foreign agents’ global control configuration without consent. It also starts the package daemon and installs login persistence. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-05T02:40:13.192Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-05T02:43:04.078Z - **Download time:** 764 ms - **Static scan time:** 165 ms - **AI review time:** 169956 ms - **Total time:** 170886 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installation automatically modifies foreign agents’ global control configuration without consent. It also starts the package daemon and installs login persistence. - **Trigger:** The npm postinstall lifecycle automatically invokes the installer. - **Impact:** The package gains influence over agent tool approval across projects and continues running through login persistence. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, src/installers/postinstall.js, src/installers/claude-code.js, src/installers/util.js, src/installers/codex.js, src/installers/autostart.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-05T02:43:04.078Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Detected agent directories select global installers that write approval configuration and command hooks; automatic daemon startup and service installation follow. - **Attack narrative:** During npm installation, the postinstall script detects installed agents and calls their installers with global configuration enabled. Claude receives a wildcard tool hook, while Codex receives an approval policy if one is absent. These writes happen without an intervening consent prompt. The same automatic path starts a detached daemon and enables operating-system autostart. The supplied policy explicitly blocks unconsented install-time mutation of foreign agent control surfaces. - **Rationale:** Inspected source proves automatic, unconsented postinstall writes to foreign agents’ global control configuration. This meets the explicit blocking rule regardless of the package’s safety-oriented purpose. - **Files touched:** .claude/settings.json, .codex/config.toml, bumper.service ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for policy risk:** package.json automatically runs src/installers/postinstall.js after installation., The postinstall code detects agent directories and invokes their installers with global configuration enabled, without a consent prompt., The Claude installer adds a command hook matching every tool to global .claude/settings.json; the utility writes the modified configuration., The Codex installer writes an approval policy into .codex/config.toml when none is already set., Postinstall also starts a detached daemon and enables autostart; the Linux installer writes and immediately enables a user service. - **Evidence against:** The Codex installer preserves an existing approval policy, and the Claude installer avoids duplicate hooks., The inspected account code implements package-specific authentication and usage requests; it does not establish unrelated credential theft. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to bumper-guard@0.2.0. - Avoid installing bumper-guard@0.2.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node src/installers/postinstall.js || true ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node src/installers/postinstall.js || true ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** src/installers/autostart.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: const path = require("path"); L4: const { execFileSync } = require("child_process"); L5: ... L10: L11: const BIN_PATH = path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "bin", "bumper.js"); L12: const LAUNCH_AGENT_LABEL = "com.bumper.autostart"; ... L26: const WIN_STARTUP_DIR = () => L27: path.join(process.env.APPDATA || path.join(os.homedir(), "AppData", "Roaming"), "Microsoft", "Windows", "Start Menu", "Programs", "Startup"); L28: const WIN_LAUNCHER_PATH = () => path.join(WIN_STARTUP_DIR(), "BumperAutostart.vbs"); ... L79: fs.writeFileSync(LAUNCH_AGENT_PATH, plistContents()); L80: run("launchctl", ["load", "-w", LAUNCH_AGENT_PATH]); L81: return { platform: "darwin", mechanism: "launchd LaunchAgent", ref: LAUNCH_AGENT_PATH }; ``` ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** src/installers/autostart.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.postinstall -> src/installers/postinstall.js -> src/installers/autostart.js L3: const path = require("path"); L4: const { execFileSync } = require("child_process"); L5: ... L10: L11: const BIN_PATH = path.join(__dirname, "..", "..", "bin", "bumper.js"); L12: const LAUNCH_AGENT_LABEL = "com.bumper.autostart"; ... L26: const WIN_STARTUP_DIR = () => L27: path.join(process.env.APPDATA || path.join(os.homedir(), "AppData", "Roaming"), "Microsoft", "Windows", "Start Menu", "Programs", "Startup"); L28: const WIN_LAUNCHER_PATH = () => path.join(WIN_STARTUP_DIR(), "BumperAutostart.vbs"); ... L79: fs.writeFileSync(LAUNCH_AGENT_PATH, plistContents()); L80: run("launchctl", ["load", "-w", LAUNCH_AGENT_PATH]); L81: return { platform: "darwin", mechanism: " ``` ### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 10. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 12. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** src/daemon.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1 ``` ### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/installers/autostart.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = bumper-guard@0.2.8 matchedPath = src/installers/autostart.js matchedIdentity = npm:YnVtcGVyLWd1YXJk:0.2.8 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/account.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = bumper-guard@0.2.8 matchedPath = src/account.js matchedIdentity = npm:YnVtcGVyLWd1YXJk:0.2.8 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/policy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = bumper-guard@0.2.6 matchedPath = src/policy.js matchedIdentity = npm:YnVtcGVyLWd1YXJk:0.2.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 5 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 5 ### Published dependency entries - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.12.0 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - express ^4.21.2 (Dependency) - js-yaml ^4.1.0 (Dependency) - zod ^3.23.8 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** bumper-guard - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.2.0 - **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE - **Version published:** 2026-08-28T11:06:39.456Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-28T12:08:31.962Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-05T02:43:04.078Z - **Known versions:** 12 - **Latest version:** 0.2.13 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** A plain-language safety net for vibe coders. Pauses risky things your AI assistant (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex CLI, Copilot CLI) is about to do, explains them in plain English, and lets you decide. - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18 - **Artifact files:** 23 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 66,321 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Homepage]()