registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / cami-design
cami-design
Camille Pawlak's Claude Code design skill — layout, interaction, copy, and engineer modes for building, reviewing, and shipping interfaces with intent.
This report shows the evidence for cami-design@0.3.4. 2 of 5 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.4.0, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source confirms the scanner’s core finding: postinstall automatically installs package-controlled Claude skills into the user’s global Claude configuration. Under the firewall policy, that concrete unconsented control-surface mutation warrants blocking even though no separate exfiltration chain was found.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
npm installation
Impact
Package-controlled AI-agent instructions become active in the user's Claude environment; existing skill paths may be renamed and replaced.
Mechanism
Automatic postinstall deployment of package-supplied Claude skills
Policy narrative
On npm installation, the package creates ~/.claude/skills and symlinks all bundled skill directories into it. If a target name already exists as a regular file or directory, it renames it to .bak before activating the package-controlled replacement. This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad external AI-agent control surface.
AI rationale
The source confirms the scanner’s core finding: postinstall automatically installs package-controlled Claude skills into the user’s global Claude configuration. Under the firewall policy, that concrete unconsented control-surface mutation warrants blocking even though no separate exfiltration chain was found.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install.jsscripts/uninstall.jsscripts/eval.jsskills/cami-design/SKILL.mdskills/cami-design-copy/SKILL.mdskills/cami-design-engineer/SKILL.mdskills/cami-design-interaction/SKILL.mdskills/cami-design-layout/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 95.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json runs scripts/install.js as postinstall.
- scripts/install.js creates ~/.claude/skills during installation.
- scripts/install.js symlinks every bundled skill into ~/.claude/skills.
- Existing non-symlink skill paths are renamed to .bak before replacement.
- The mutation occurs without an explicit user command.
Evidence against
- No install-time network, credential harvesting, shell execution, or remote payload loading was found.
- scripts/eval.js calls only api.anthropic.com and is user-invoked, not lifecycle-triggered.
- scripts/uninstall.js removes only symlinks under the same Claude skills target.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/install.jsView file
6Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence:
L6: const skillsDir = path.join(__dirname, "..", "skills");
L7: const targetDir = path.join(os.homedir(), ".claude", "skills");
L8:
...
L14:
L15: // Ensure ~/.claude/skills exists
L16: fs.mkdirSync(targetDir, { recursive: true });
L17:
Payload evidence from skills/cami-design/SKILL.md:
L172:
L173: - **Version**: the canonical version is `package.json`. Sub-skill `metadata.version` fields are intentionally absent — they never moved in lockstep with absorptions, so they were d...
L174: - **Evolution**: this skill grows by absorbing techniques from upstream skills. Never copy blindly — run the eval corpus first, then cherry-pick into the relevant reference file, t...
Findings
1 Critical1 High4 Medium3 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to cami-design@0.3.4.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing cami-design@0.3.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.
Versions
5 known versions0.4.0latestSuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedJul 15, 2026, 10:04 AM0.3.4shownMaliciousSoft block: AI-agent control surfaceBlockPublishedJul 11, 2026, 3:48 PM0.3.1SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedJul 5, 2026, 12:12 PM0.3.0SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedJul 5, 2026, 11:57 AM