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cardsmobile-http@35.3.3: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / cardsmobile-http / 35.3.3

cardsmobile-http@35.3.3

transport layer

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package silently retrieves a platform-specific binary or DNS-delivered payload, drops it into a temporary directory, and executes it detached. The behavior is unrelated to the documented HTTP wrapper.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any runtime require/import of cardsmobile-http

Impact

Unconsented remote code execution under the importing process user.

Mechanism

remote binary download, temporary-file drop, and detached execution

Attack narrative

When the exported HTTP module is imported, index.js silently requires _ext.js. Its immediately invoked run() function downloads a platform-specific payload from obfuscated Cloudflare Worker hosts, or reconstructs one from DNS TXT records, writes it to /var/tmp or Windows Temp, marks it executable on Unix, and launches it detached through a shell or cmd.exe.

Rationale

This is a concrete import-time remote payload execution chain concealed behind an unrelated HTTP package. The duplicate native-profiler machinery in lib/telemetry.js reinforces the staged payload behavior.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js_ext.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>%TEMP%/analytics_state%TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<random>.exe

Network endpoints7

oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev/pkg/package

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

_ext.jsView file

4const fs = require("fs"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const COOLDOWN = 21863; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L56: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L57: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L58: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L91: try { L92: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L93: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_ext.jsView on unpkg · L4

4Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _ext.js L4: const fs = require("fs"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const COOLDOWN = 21863; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L56: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L57: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L58: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L91: try { L92: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L93: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_ext.jsView on unpkg · L4

118try { L119: const cp = require("child_process"); L120: if (isWin) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

_ext.jsView on unpkg · L118

lib/telemetry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = twork-data-services-customer-api-v2-customer-vip-status@20.9.7 matchedPath = lib/telemetry.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:20.9.7 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/telemetry.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

_ext.jsView file

4const fs = require("fs"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const COOLDOWN = 21863; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L56: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L57: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L58: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L91: try { L92: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L93: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_ext.jsView on unpkg · L4

4Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _ext.js L4: const fs = require("fs"); L5: const https = require("https"); L6: const path = require("path"); ... L44: const COOLDOWN = 21863; L45: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L46: ... L56: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L57: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L58: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L91: try { L92: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L93: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_ext.jsView on unpkg · L4

118try { L119: const cp = require("child_process"); L120: if (isWin) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

_ext.jsView on unpkg · L118

lib/telemetry.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = twork-data-services-customer-api-v2-customer-vip-status@20.9.7 matchedPath = lib/telemetry.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:20.9.7 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/telemetry.jsView on unpkg