---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/ccclub/v/0.9.8"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/ccclub/v/0.9.8.md"
package: "ccclub"
report_status: "published"
title: "ccclub@0.9.8 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.9.8"
---

# ccclub@0.9.8 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.9.8
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The install hook automatically modifies Claude Code event hooks when its settings file exists, creating a guarded first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected behavior supports a warning, but does not establish a concrete malicious attack.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-10T21:10:01.455Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-10T21:10:26.290Z
- **Download time:** 509 ms
- **Static scan time:** 793 ms
- **AI review time:** 23532 ms
- **Total time:** 24835 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The npm postinstall script can add a ccclub sync hook to Claude Code settings automatically. This is an agent extension lifecycle risk, with no confirmed malicious payload or credential theft established.

- **Trigger:** Installing ccclub with npm when ~/.claude/settings.json exists.

- **Impact:** Subsequent Claude Code events can invoke ccclub sync, which may transmit configured usage data to the service.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.cjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-10T21:10:26.290Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The postinstall script appends version-pinned ccclub sync commands to Claude Code SessionEnd and Stop hooks and saves the settings file.

- **Rationale:** The install hook automatically modifies Claude Code event hooks when its settings file exists, creating a guarded first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected behavior supports a warning, but does not establish a concrete malicious attack.

- **Files touched:** ~/.claude/settings.json

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 91.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json runs scripts/postinstall.cjs during installation., The postinstall targets the user's Claude Code settings file and defines a version-pinned ccclub sync hook., When settings exist, the installer adds the hook to SessionEnd and Stop events and writes the settings back., This is first-party agent hook setup with no install-time consent check; the installed hook later runs ccclub sync., The inspected dist/index.js location defines Claude project data paths; it does not establish a separate attack behavior.

- **Evidence against:** The installer only proceeds with Claude settings when the settings file already exists., It matches and replaces ccclub-managed hooks while preserving unrelated hook commands., The macOS heartbeat update runs only when an existing ccclub LaunchAgent plist is present., No credential theft or malicious network behavior was established from the inspected evidence.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to ccclub@0.9.8.

- Review the evidence and your use of ccclub@0.9.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/dist/index.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: import { createInterface as createInterface2 } from "readline/promises";
L8: import { stdin, stdout } from "process";
L9: import chalk5 from "chalk";
...
L17: import { randomBytes } from "crypto";
L18: import { execSync } from "child_process";
L19: 
...
L127: var BLOCK_DURATION_MS = BLOCK_DURATION_MIN * 60 * 1e3;
L128: var DEFAULT_API_URL = "https://ccclub.dev";
L129: var CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR = ".claude/projects";
...
L2551: function getConfigDir() {
L2552: return join(homedir(), CCCLUB_CONFIG_DIR);
L2553: }
```

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/dist/index.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: import { createInterface as createInterface2 } from "readline/promises";
L8: import { stdin, stdout } from "process";
L9: import chalk5 from "chalk";
...
L17: import { randomBytes } from "crypto";
L18: import { execSync } from "child_process";
L19: 
...
L127: var BLOCK_DURATION_MS = BLOCK_DURATION_MIN * 60 * 1e3;
L128: var DEFAULT_API_URL = "https://ccclub.dev";
L129: var CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR = ".claude/projects";
...
L2551: function getConfigDir() {
L2552: return join(homedir(), CCCLUB_CONFIG_DIR);
L2553: }
```

### 10. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/scripts/postinstall.cjs>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L13: 
L14: const settingsPath = path.join(os.homedir(), ".claude", "settings.json");
L15: const HOOK_COMMAND = `npx --yes ccclub@${pkg.version} sync --silent`;
...
L172: try {
L173: fs.writeFileSync(tmp, data);
L174: fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
```

### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/scripts/postinstall.cjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.postinstall -> scripts/postinstall.cjs
L10: const os = require("os");
L11: const { execFileSync } = require("child_process");
L12: const pkg = require("../package.json");
L13: 
L14: const settingsPath = path.join(os.homedir(), ".claude", "settings.json");
L15: const HOOK_COMMAND = `npx --yes ccclub@${pkg.version} sync --silent`;
...
L127: 
L128: const settings = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(settingsPath, "utf-8"));
L129: if (!settings.hooks) settings.hooks = {};
...
L225: // init/join/sync's decision, not npm's.
L226: if (process.platform !== "darwin") return;
L227: if (!fs.existsSync(PLIST_PATH)) return;
```

### 12. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 13. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/dist/index.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = ccclub@0.9.7
matchedPath = dist/index.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2NjbHVi:0.9.7
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/ccclub@0.9.8/scripts/postinstall.cjs>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = ccclub@0.9.7
matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.cjs
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2NjbHVi:0.9.7
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 5
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 6
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 5

### Published dependency entries
- chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency)
- cli-table3 ^0.6.5 (Dependency)
- commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency)
- glob ^13.0.6 (Dependency)
- ora ^8.1.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** ccclub
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.9.8
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-10-10T04:06:49.380Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-09T05:48:19.380Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-11T19:12:27.401Z
- **Known versions:** 14
- **Latest version:** 0.9.9
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Claude Code and Codex leaderboard among friends for coding agent tokens and costs
- **Maintainers:** mazzystar
- **Keywords:** claude, claude-code, claude-code-leaderboard, codex, codex-leaderboard, opencode, amp, grok, cursor, coding-agent, ai-coding-agent, token-usage
- **Artifact files:** 8
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 298,572 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/ccclub/v/0.9.8>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/mazzzystar/ccclub>)
- [Homepage](<https://ccclub.dev/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/mazzzystar/ccclub/issues>)
