--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/chai-as-staged" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/chai-as-staged/report.md" package: "chai-as-staged" report_status: "published" title: "chai-as-staged@6.0.4 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "6.0.4" --- # chai-as-staged@6.0.4 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Arbitrary code execution in the consuming project environment under attacker-controlled remote response - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Block by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 6.0.4 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Source inspection confirms a user-invoked staged payload loader with network retrieval and dynamic execution, which is concrete malicious behavior. The absence of install hooks lowers trigger breadth but does not make the runtime RCE benign. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 97.0% - **Started:** 2026-07-01T05:06:40.077Z - **Finished:** 2026-07-01T05:07:19.192Z - **Download time:** 507 ms - **Static scan time:** 61 ms - **AI review time:** 38546 ms - **Total time:** 39115 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Runtime use of the package launches a detached background Node process that fetches and executes remote JavaScript. The remote payload is taken from an HTTPS response field and run with require access. - **Trigger:** Calling the exported function from index.js, including smoke:pino node ./index.js path if adapted to invoke it - **Impact:** Arbitrary code execution in the consuming project environment under attacker-controlled remote response - **Evidence paths:** package.json, index.js, lib/initializeCaller.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-07-01T05:07:19.192Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** detached background remote code execution - **Attack narrative:** The package exposes a middleware-like function. When invoked, index.js spawns a detached Node child running lib/initializeCaller.js. That script decodes an embedded URL, fetches JSON from it using axios, extracts data.cookie, compiles it with Function.constructor, and executes it with require access. This is a staged remote payload loader unrelated to the claimed package purpose. - **Rationale:** Source inspection confirms a user-invoked staged payload loader with network retrieval and dynamic execution, which is concrete malicious behavior. The absence of install hooks lowers trigger breadth but does not make the runtime RCE benign. - **Files touched:** lib/initializeCaller.js - **Network endpoints:** https://amethyst-lorrin-26.tiiny.site/index.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** package.json main is index.js with no lifecycle hooks but runtime entrypoint is active., index.js spawns detached node process for lib/initializeCaller.js when exported middleware is called., lib/initializeCaller.js decodes a Base64 HTTPS URL and calls it with axios., lib/initializeCaller.js reads response.data.cookie and executes it via new Function.constructor("require", response)., Package contents appear copied from pino docs/code while published as chai-as-staged. - **Evidence against:** No install-time lifecycle script in package.json., No direct local credential/file harvesting found in inspected source., Attack requires the exported middleware/function to be invoked, not mere require. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to chai-as-staged@6.0.4. - Avoid installing chai-as-staged@6.0.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package source references dynamic code evaluation. ### 3. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. High: Base64 Obscured Url - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** lib/initializeCaller.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const process = { ... L12: (async function initializeCaller(..._args) { L13: const apiEndpoint = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); L14: const apiHeaderKey = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY); ``` ### 6. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 7. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 8. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** docs/transports.md - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in docs/transports.md Public source snippet (untrusted): ```markdown patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 550 matchedText = password...rd', ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 4 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4 ### Published dependency entries - axios ^1.10.0 (Dependency) - parse-json ^8.3.0 (Dependency) - request ^2.88.2 (Dependency) - sqlite3 ^5.1.7 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** chai-as-staged - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 6.0.4 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-06-30T23:18:13.953Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T05:07:19.192Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-07-01T05:07:19.192Z - **Known versions:** 1 - **Latest version:** 6.0.4 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** This document describes the management of vulnerabilities for the project and all modules within the organization. - **Author:** Robert King - **Keywords:** fast, logger, stream, json - **Artifact files:** 43 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 270,604 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Issues]() - [OpenSSF/OSV advisory]() - [PACKAGE]()