chainlink-price-feed-aggregator@1.1.12

Package name impersonates Chainlink branding while being published by an unrelated identity (author 'Web3 Developer Tools <dev@web3-tools.dev>', repo github.com/web3/...). The package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs `node -e` to perform an HTTPS GET to `rqnyz-2605-7280-7--2000-c51.run.pinggy-free.link/npm/-/binary/telemetry` — an anonymous Pinggy tunnel host with no relationship to the package's declared purpose (Chainlink price feeds) or publisher. The path is crafted to look like an npm registry binary path, and errors are swallowed via try/catch to keep the install silent. The fetch leaks the installer's IP, install timestamp, and confirms successful installation on a victim machine, acting as a recon beacon. The package's main entry is a 138-byte stub with no actual price-feed functionality, indicating the package is a lure rather than a working library. Brand-impersonating name + functionless stub + install-time beacon to anonymous tunnel infrastructure is the canonical supply-chain bait pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (579c34a390bb282d238ce871e7ba0fdb0e01aa8884d58d5baa3ed8ddd265e6c5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.