chat-recall@0.5.19
One memory across every AI coding tool — indexes Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Codex, OpenCode, Antigravity and Cursor sessions, redacts secrets, and exposes them to your agent over MCP.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete credential theft, foreign-package overwrite, or unconsented install-time agent-control mutation was confirmed. The automatic globally installed server-supplied update is a meaningful remote-code-execution trust boundary and warrants a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The watch daemon automatically downloads, installs, and restarts an update from the configured logged-in server.
- The downloaded archive is globally installed with npm, creating a remote code execution trust boundary.
- An explicit install-hooks command writes chat-recall commands into Claude Code hook configuration.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The update URL is derived from the configured server and checked against a server-provided SHA-256 value.
- Hook installation is an explicit user command, not install-time mutation.
- The sync client states that it redacts secrets before uploading session data.
Source & flagged code
19 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/self-restart.jsView on unpkg · L40Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/watch.jsView on unpkg · L1200Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to chat-recall@0.5.19.
See all versions of chat-recall for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of chat-recall@0.5.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.