chat-recall@0.5.28
One memory across every AI coding tool — indexes Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Codex, OpenCode, Antigravity and Cursor sessions, redacts secrets, and exposes them to your agent over MCP.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo npm install lifecycle hook or self-dependency was found, so the evidence does not meet the blocking install-hook-abuse threshold. The automatic cross-tool skill setup and same-server remote updater are concrete dangerous capabilities that warrant a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The MCP entrypoint automatically installs or refreshes bundled skills into detected AI tool directories when the MCP server starts.
- The package downloads an update from the configured server, accepts a checksum supplied by that same server, and runs npm to install the downloaded archive.
- The CLI can write command hooks into Claude configuration; those hooks run the package after AI-session events.
- The default configured service host is chatrecall.dev.
- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- Skill removal is limited to package-marked directories, and unmarked same-name skills are skipped.
- Network sync and updates use the user-configured login server rather than a hidden fixed credential endpoint.
Source & flagged code
18 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/self-restart.jsView on unpkg · L40Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/watch.jsView on unpkg · L1200Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to chat-recall@0.5.28.
See all versions of chat-recall for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of chat-recall@0.5.28 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.