registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / chemx / 26.10.4-1258

chemx@26.10.4-1258

Chemical X Protocol: Private drop-in architecture starter kit and capsule generator

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The active postinstall hook automatically registers chemx in project Cursor and VS Code configs and, when present, the user’s Antigravity config. This is unconsented mutation of multiple AI-agent control surfaces, so the package warrants a block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Installing chemx through npm in a consumer project.

Impact

Cursor, VS Code, or Antigravity can discover and launch the package’s MCP server without a separate setup choice.

Mechanism

The hook calls the MCP installer, which writes .cursor/mcp.json and .vscode/mcp.json and conditionally updates the user’s Antigravity MCP configuration.

Policy narrative

Installing the package triggers configuration changes in multiple AI-agent surfaces without an install-time consent prompt. The registered server points to chemx’s own MCP command; the confirmed concern is the automatic control-surface setup, not demonstrated credential theft or remote execution.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsoncli/postinstall.jscli/mcp/installer.js.cursor/mcp.json.vscode/mcp.json~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 91.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for policy risk

package.json runs cli/postinstall.js from its postinstall hook.
The postinstall handler calls installAllMcpConfigs for the installing project without a consent check.
The MCP installer writes project Cursor and VS Code configuration and adds a chemical-x server entry.
The installer also updates Antigravity’s global MCP config when its config directory exists.
The launcher integration’s test confirms project MCP configs are created; separate wizard code writes agent steering files.

Evidence against

The registered server runs this package’s own MCP command; the inspected installer code shows no credential forwarding or direct network endpoint.
The separate agent-steering wizard offers an interactive selection and a None option.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

11 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView file

27patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView on unpkg · L27

27patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in cli/errors/errors.spec.js

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView on unpkg · L27

cli/audit-preflight-git.jsView file

1import fs from 'node:fs'; L2: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L3:

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

cli/audit-preflight-git.jsView on unpkg · L1

cli/build/executor.jsView file

11const child = spawn(command, { L12: shell: true, L13: cwd,

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

cli/build/executor.jsView on unpkg · L11

cli/license.jsView file

3import os from 'node:os'; L4: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L5: import { ... L17: L18: export const API_BASE = process.env.CHEMICAL_X_API_URL || 'https://chemicalx.xophz.com'; L19: export const GATEKEEPER_API_URL = process.env.COMPASS_GATEKEEPER_URL || 'https://mycompassconsulting.com/wp-json/compass/v1/gatekeeper';

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

cli/license.jsView on unpkg · L3

cli/mcp/installer.jsView file

1Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => { L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} }; L22: ... L30: L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers && typeof parsed.mcpServers === 'object'); L32: if (!hasMcpServersObject) { L33: parsed.mcpServers = {}; L34: } L35: L36: parsed.mcpServers[SERVER_KEY] = serverDef; L37: return JSON.stringify(parsed, null, 2) + '\n'; ... L90: const cursorDir = path.join(resolvedTarget, '.cursor'); Write operation from cli/mcp/installer.js: L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => { L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} }; L22: ... L30: L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers &

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

cli/mcp/installer.jsView on unpkg · L1

cli/pillars-wizard.jsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. st pick = usegum ? gumchoose(choices, 'select architectural pillars configuration') : await promptquestion('select pillars: [1=recommended, 2=strict, 3=custom, 4=minimal, 5=none] (default: 1): '); if (pick && (pick.startswith('2.') || pick === '2')) { selectedpresetkey = 'strict'; selectedpillarids = [...pillar_presets.strict.pillars]; } else if (pick && (pick.startswith('3.') || pick === '3')) { selectedpresetkey = 'custom'; for (const pillar of pillars) { const defaultchoice = pillar_presets.recommended.pillars.includes(pillar.id) ? 'y/n' : 'y/n'; const isdefaultyes = defaultchoice === 'y/n'; const answer = a

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

cli/pillars-wizard.jsView on unpkg

scripts/pre-commit.shView file

•path = scripts/pre-commit.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 8215 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/pre-commit.shView on unpkg

cli/audit/ai-slop-detector.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

cli/audit/ai-slop-detector.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

11 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView file

27patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView on unpkg · L27

Findings

3 Critical6 High5 Medium5 Low

CriticalCritical Secretcli/errors/errors.spec.js

CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackcli/mcp/installer.js

CriticalSecret Patterncli/errors/errors.spec.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processcli/audit-preflight-git.js

HighShellcli/build/executor.js

HighSame File Env Network Executioncli/license.js

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationcli/pillars-wizard.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedcli/audit/ai-slop-detector.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumNetwork

Medium

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to chemx@26.10.4-1258.

See all versions of chemx for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing chemx@26.10.4-1258. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-12 07:00:58.224Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other AI-agent control-surface risk packages

Behavioral surface

Related packages

Other AI-agent control-surface risk packages

Source & flagged code