---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/chemx"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/chemx/v/26.9.17-606.md"
package: "chemx"
report_status: "published"
title: "chemx@26.9.17-606 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "26.9.17-606"
---

# chemx@26.9.17-606 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. The package adds an MCP server to AI-agent control configurations without first asking the consumer, enabling those agents to invoke the configured server.

- **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured
- **Firewall policy:** Warn by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface
- **Selected version:** 26.9.17-606
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The package's automatic postinstall hook writes MCP server configuration into consumer AI-agent settings without consent. This is a verified install-time control-surface mutation, so it warrants blocking.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-12T06:55:39.398Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-12T06:56:22.962Z
- **Download time:** 502 ms
- **Static scan time:** 951 ms
- **AI review time:** 42110 ms
- **Total time:** 43564 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The automatic install hook registers a Chemical X MCP server in consumer AI editor configuration. It also writes a user-level Antigravity configuration when that configuration directory exists.

- **Trigger:** Installing the package through npm runs its postinstall hook.

- **Impact:** The package adds an MCP server to AI-agent control configurations without first asking the consumer, enabling those agents to invoke the configured server.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, cli/postinstall.js, cli/mcp/installer.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T06:56:22.962Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook calls the configuration installer for the consumer directory, which writes Cursor and VS Code MCP files and updates an existing global Antigravity MCP file.

- **Attack narrative:** During npm installation, the postinstall hook targets the consumer directory and invokes the MCP configuration installer without a consent prompt. The installer adds a Chemical X server entry to project editor configuration and, when present, the user's global Antigravity configuration. This is an install-time mutation of AI-agent control surfaces.

- **Rationale:** The package's automatic postinstall hook writes MCP server configuration into consumer AI-agent settings without consent. This is a verified install-time control-surface mutation, so it warrants blocking.

- **Files touched:** .cursor/mcp.json, .vscode/mcp.json, ~/.gemini/config/mcp\_config.json

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for policy risk:** The package manifest runs a postinstall script that invokes cli/postinstall.js., The postinstall hook targets the consumer directory and calls installAllMcpConfigs without a consent prompt., The installer writes an MCP server entry to the consumer project's Cursor configuration., When no local server is found, the configured command runs npx -y chemx mcp., The installer also writes a global Antigravity MCP configuration and synchronizes agent schemas.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to chemx@26.9.17-606.

- Avoid installing chemx@26.9.17-606. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** cli/audit-preflight-git.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/cli/audit-preflight-git.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import fs from 'node:fs';
L2: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
L3:
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** cli/terminal.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/cli/terminal.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: } else if (platform === "win32") {
L11: spawnSync("cmd.exe", ["/c", "start", '""', url], { stdio: "ignore", timeout: 3000 });
L12: } else {
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** cli/license.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/cli/license.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L3: import os from 'node:os';
L4: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
L5: import {
...
L17: 
L18: export const API_BASE = process.env.CHEMICAL_X_API_URL || 'https://chemicalx.xophz.com';
L19: export const GATEKEEPER_API_URL = process.env.COMPASS_GATEKEEPER_URL || 'https://mycompassconsulting.com/wp-json/compass/v1/gatekeeper';
```

### 10. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** cli/mcp/installer.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/cli/mcp/installer.js>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface:
L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => {
L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} };
L22: 
...
L30: 
L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers && typeof parsed.mcpServers === 'object');
L32: if (!hasMcpServersObject) {
L33: parsed.mcpServers = {};
L34: }
L35: 
L36: parsed.mcpServers[SERVER_KEY] = serverDef;
L37: return JSON.stringify(parsed, null, 2) + '\n';
...
L90: const cursorDir = path.join(resolvedTarget, '.cursor');
Write operation from cli/mcp/installer.js:
L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => {
L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} };
L22: 
...
L30: 
L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers &
```

### 11. High: External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** cli/scaffold.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/cli/scaffold.js>)

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path:
udes('--no-interactive') ||
      boolean(process.env.ci) ||
      process.stdout?.istty === false ||
      process.stdin?.istty === false ||
      boolean(process.argv?.some((arg) => arg === '--headless' || arg === '--ci' || arg === '--yes' || arg === '-y'));

    if (isheadless) {
      targetname = 'my-molecular-app';
    } else {
      targetname = hasgum()
        ? guminput('project directory name:', 'my-molecular-app')
        : await promptquestion('project directory name [my-molecular-app]: ');
    }
  }

  const finaldirname = targetname.trim() || 'my-molecular-app';
  const targetdir = path.resolve(process.cwd(), finaldirname);

  const direxists = fs.existssync(targetdir);
  const isdirno
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** cli/scaffold.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/cli/scaffold.js>)

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
s = {};

  if (!licensekey) {
    process.stdout.write(
      '\n\x1b[38;2;98;201;255m⚡ chemical x: community edition (free)\x1b[0m\n' +
      'the community version is free because you tell us about your project\n' +
      'and the app will automatically post your scorecard to our github discussions.\n' +
      'you get a free plug, we get data to prove chemical x works and brings real value.\n' +
      'everybody wins! thank you for supporting our community version.\n\n'
    );
    files = loadlocalblueprintfiles();
    iscommunity = true;
  } else {
    files = await fetchstarterkitfiles(licensekey);
  }

  let targetname = projectname;
  if (!targetname) {
    const isheadle
```

### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 14. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 15. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** scripts/pre-commit.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/scripts/pre-commit.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = scripts/pre-commit.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 5175
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** cli/license.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/chemx@26.9.17-606/cli/license.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = chemx@26.9.14-1358
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2hlbXg:26.9.14-1358
similarity = 0.529
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 5
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 5
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 5

### Published dependency entries
- @babel/parser ^7.29.8 (Dependency)
- @babel/traverse ^7.29.8 (Dependency)
- @babel/types ^7.29.8 (Dependency)
- react ^18.3.1 (Dependency)
- react-dom ^18.3.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** chemx
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 26.9.17-606
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-17T14:22:37.246Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-09T11:16:23.228Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-22T03:49:45.617Z
- **Known versions:** 40
- **Latest version:** 26.10.19-530
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Chemical X Protocol: Private drop-in architecture starter kit and capsule generator
- **Artifact files:** 164
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,451,915 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/chemx/v/26.9.17-606>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/Chemical-X-Protocol/starter-kit.git>)
- [Homepage](<https://chemicalx.xophz.com/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/Chemical-X-Protocol/starter-kit/issues>)
