claude-code-infinite@1.0.29
Wrapper for Claude Code CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall telemetry is package-aligned, sends a bounded install event, and honors diagnostics opt-outs and additional skip conditions. Inspection of the lifecycle and runtime source did not confirm the scanner's alleged payload execution or agent control-surface behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook runs an install ping to the same Polychat service used by the package; its event contains package and runtime metadata plus an install identifier.
- The diagnostics send can be disabled through environment or config opt-outs and skips root, CI, automatic updates, and development installs.
- Claude Code installation is offered to the user and runs only after an affirmative answer; locating Claude Code probes paths and uses a bounded Windows registry query.
- Saved MemTree keys are sent only to listed Polychat hosts, and the output helpers format supplied tree and transcript data.
- The required runtime, lifecycle, diagnostics, and dependency sources show no confirmed malicious behavior; the inspected dependency entrypoint delegates to its spawn library.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/claude-install.jsView on unpkg · L77Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to claude-code-infinite@1.0.29.
See all versions of claude-code-infinite for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of claude-code-infinite@1.0.29 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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