claude-code-infinite@1.0.32
Wrapper for Claude Code CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package sends install-time telemetry by default, which warrants a warning even though the inspected event contains only limited installation metadata and has opt-outs. I found no evidence that this hook sends credentials or project data.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The npm postinstall runs the install-ping entry point automatically.
- The install ping POSTs an “installed” event to api.polychat.co during installation unless its skip conditions apply.
- The event contains the package version, Node version, OS, architecture, install method, and install ID; the ping is disabled by recognized opt-outs.
- The reported install event is limited to package/runtime details and a random install ID; the inspected payload does not include credentials, paths, hostnames, or project contents.
- The hook skips sending when diagnostics are opted out, in CI, under root, for development installs, and during background updates.
- Claude Code credentials are described as staying with Claude Code; the observed MemTree authorization uses the package’s separate Polychat API key.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/claude-install.jsView on unpkg · L77Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to claude-code-infinite@1.0.32.
See all versions of claude-code-infinite for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of claude-code-infinite@1.0.32 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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