claude-code-templates@1.32.0
Component templates and tracking system for Claude Code
AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is suspicious runtime telemetry: component installs send a project-relative local path to the package’s own service by default, and the README does not disclose the collection. Opt-out flags exist, and the source shows no credential theft or other concrete attack behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Tracking is enabled by default unless an opt-out flag or CI is set.
- Successful component installs include the target directory relative to the current working directory in tracking metadata; the service sends that metadata to www.aitmpl.com.
- The tracking payload includes a path field populated from that target-directory metadata.
- Users can disable tracking with CCT_NO_TRACKING=true, CCT_NO_ANALYTICS=true, or CI=true.
- The path-bearing tracking call occurs after a component installation succeeds in the CLI flow.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
cli-tool/bin/create-claude-config.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to claude-code-templates@1.32.0.
See all versions of claude-code-templates for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of claude-code-templates@1.32.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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