claude-code-zanii@2.14.1
Reverse-engineered Anthropic Claude Code CLI — interactive AI coding assistant in the terminal
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a concrete conditional credential-forwarding capability to an unrestricted endpoint, but it is user-invoked and not an automatic install-time attack. The source does not establish covert default exfiltration or a blocking malware chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The reachable ssh feature obtains the existing Anthropic API key or stored OAuth access token.
- Its proxy takes ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL directly from the environment without destination validation.
- The proxy attaches that credential to requests sent to the selected upstream URL.
- The CLI imports and runs this SSH session feature after the user invokes the ssh command.
- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The observed credential forwarding is tied to an explicit SSH command, not package installation.
Source & flagged code
19 flaggedSource appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/chunk-5ytsdgrp.jsView on unpkg · L33Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/chunk-5ytsdgrp.jsView on unpkg · L33Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to claude-code-zanii@2.14.1.
See all versions of claude-code-zanii for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of claude-code-zanii@2.14.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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