---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/claude-flow/v/3.38.12"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/claude-flow/v/3.38.12.md"
package: "claude-flow"
report_status: "published"
title: "claude-flow@3.38.12 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "3.38.12"
---

# claude-flow@3.38.12 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse
- **Selected version:** 3.38.12
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Static source inspection supports a warn-level agent-extension capability, not a malicious verdict. The static malicious label is not substantiated by an install-time attack chain.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-15T15:50:55.056Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-15T15:52:20.609Z
- **Download time:** 512 ms
- **Static scan time:** 8616 ms
- **AI review time:** 76423 ms
- **Total time:** 85553 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The user-run CLI can install and later refresh Claude Code project/global helper and hook configuration. Browser automation can fetch its declared \`agent-browser\` dependency at MCP-tool runtime; no concrete malicious chain was confirmed.

- **Trigger:** User runs \`claude-flow\`/\`ruflo init\`, another CLI command in an initialized project, or invokes a browser MCP tool.

- **Impact:** Adds/updates Claude Code hooks, permissions, MCP configuration, and helper scripts; browser tooling may install \`agent-browser\` on demand.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/init.js, v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/executor.js, v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/settings-generator.js, v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/index.js, v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/browser-tools.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-15T15:52:20.609Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Explicit AI-agent extension setup plus package-owned helper refresh

- **Rationale:** Static source inspection supports a warn-level agent-extension capability, not a malicious verdict. The static malicious label is not substantiated by an install-time attack chain.

- **Files touched:** .claude/settings.json, .claude/helpers/hook-handler.cjs, .claude/helpers/auto-memory-hook.mjs, .claude/helpers/intelligence.cjs, .claude/helpers/statusline.cjs, ~/.claude/helpers, .mcp.json

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 86.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** The explicit \`init\` command creates Claude Code settings, helpers, skills, commands, agents, and MCP configuration., Generated settings add Claude Code hook commands and permission allow-rules for this package's CLI/MCP namespace., Normal CLI use can silently refresh package-owned helpers in both the current project and \`~/.claude/helpers\`., An explicitly invoked browser MCP tool falls back to \`npx --yes agent-browser\` when its local executable is absent.

- **Evidence against:** Root package has only \`prepublishOnly\`; there is no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook., AI-agent configuration mutation is reached through the user-invoked CLI \`init\`/CLI runtime, not package installation., Reviewed browser execution uses argument-array \`execFileSync\`; the npx package name and core flags are fixed., No credential harvesting, exfiltration endpoint, remote payload loader, or destructive install-time behavior was confirmed in reviewed sources.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to claude-flow@3.38.12.

- Review the evidence and your use of claude-flow@3.38.12 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. Medium: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js>)

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 1344
matchedText = { type: ...' },
```

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L343: async execute(prompt, workDir) {
L344: const { execFile } = await import('node:child_process');
L345: const { promisify } = await import('node:util');
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/executor.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/executor.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L283: // Platform-specific command wrappers
L284: // Windows: Use PowerShell-compatible commands
L285: // Mac/Linux: Use bash-compatible commands with 2>/dev/null
```

### 6. Low: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 45.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js>)

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2103: { type: 'must-match-pattern', value: 'escape|validate|regex|filter', severity: 'major' },
L2104: { type: 'must-not-contain', value: 'eval(', severity: 'critical' },
L2105: ],
```

### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** bin/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/bin/cli.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: const cliPath = join(__dirname, '..', 'v3', '@claude-flow', 'cli', 'bin', 'cli.js');
L11: await import(pathToFileURL(cliPath).href);
```

### 8. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 9. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 10. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/daemon.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/cli/dist/src/commands/daemon.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: import { resolveDaemonProjectRoot } from '../services/daemon-autostart.js';
L8: import { fork } from 'child_process';
L9: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
...
L56: // ADR-174 M3: honored by WorkerDaemon's consolidate worker directly via
L57: // process.env — set it now so the foreground path (which runs in this
L58: // same process) picks it up too; the background path forwards it to the
...
L68: const projectRoot = resolveWorkspaceFlag(ctx.flags.workspace)
L69: ?? resolveDaemonProjectRoot(process.cwd());
L70: const isDaemonProcess = process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_DAEMON === '1';
...
L300: // Ignore SIGHUP on macOS/Linux — prevents daemon death when terminal closes (#1283)
L301: if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
L302: process.on('SIGHUP', () => { });
```

### 11. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 12. High: External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/helpers-generator.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/helpers-generator.js>)

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path:
=> {
    const escaped = escaperegex(tok.tolowercase());
    if (/\\s|\\//.test(tok)) return escaped;
    return \`\\\\b\${escaped}\\\\b\`;
  });
  return new regexp(\`(?:\${alternatives.join('|')})\`, 'i');
}

const compiled_patterns = task_patterns.map((entry) => ({
  agent: entry.agent,
  tokens: entry.tokens,
  regex: buildpattern(entry.tokens),
}));

function routetask(task) {
  const tasklower = string(task == null ? '' : task).tolowercase();
  for (const entry of compiled_patterns) {
    if (entry.regex.test(tasklower)) {
      return {
        agent: entry.agent,
        confidence: 0.6,
        reason: \`matched keyword(s) from: \${entry.tokens.join('|')}\`,
      };
    }
  }
  return {
```

### 13. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/browser-tools.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/cli/dist/src/mcp-tools/browser-tools.js>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L12: * Execute agent-browser CLI command.
L13: * Tries global agent-browser first, falls back to npx if ENOENT.
L14: *
...
L18: export async function execBrowserCommand(args, session = 'default') {
L19: const { execFileSync } = await import('child_process');
L20: const fullArgs = ['--session', session, '--json', ...args];
```

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 16. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** .claude/statusline-command.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/.claude/statusline-command.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = .claude/statusline-command.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 6239
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 17. High: Payload In Excluded Dir
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** .claude/statusline-command.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/.claude/statusline-command.sh>)

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = .claude/statusline-command.sh
kind = payload_in_excluded_dir
sizeBytes = 6239
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 18. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 19. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/shared/dist/services/v3-progress.service.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/shared/dist/services/v3-progress.service.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1
```

### 20. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/executor.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/cli/dist/src/init/executor.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = claude-flow@3.38.7
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLWZsb3c:3.38.7
similarity = 0.942
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

### 21. Medium: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/claude-flow@3.38.12/v3/%40claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js>)

Hardcoded password in v3/@claude-flow/guidance/dist/analyzer.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 2127
matchedText = { type: ...' },
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 26
- **Optional dependencies:** 10
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 7
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 36

### Published dependency entries
- @claude-flow/cli-core 3.7.0-alpha.5 (Dependency)
- @claude-flow/codex 3.0.3 (Dependency)
- @claude-flow/mcp 3.0.0-alpha.10 (Dependency)
- @claude-flow/neural 3.0.0-alpha.9 (Dependency)
- @claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation 1.0.0-alpha.18 (Dependency)
- @claude-flow/security 3.0.0-alpha.14 (Dependency)
- @claude-flow/shared 3.0.0-alpha.8 (Dependency)
- @iarna/toml ^2.2.5 (Dependency)
- @noble/ed25519 2.3.0 (Dependency)
- @ruvector/rabitq-wasm 0.1.0 (Dependency)
- ajv ^8.20.0 (Dependency)
- bcryptjs ^3.0.3 (Dependency)
- chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency)
- commander ^12.0.0 (Dependency)
- cors ^2.8.5 (Dependency)
- express \>=4.22.2 (Dependency)
- express-rate-limit \>=8.4.1 (Dependency)
- fast-uri 3.1.5 (Dependency)
- fs-extra ^11.2.0 (Dependency)
- helmet ^7.2.0 (Dependency)
- inquirer ^9.2.0 (Dependency)
- semver 7.7.3 (Dependency)
- toml ^3.0.0 (Dependency)
- ws \>=8.21.0 (Dependency)
- yaml ^2.8.0 (Dependency)
- zod 3.25.76 (Dependency)
- @claude-flow/plugin-gastown-bridge ^0.1.3 (OptionalDependency)
- @napi-rs/keyring 1.3.0 (OptionalDependency)
- @ruvector/attention ^0.1.3 (OptionalDependency)
- @ruvector/core ^0.1.30 (OptionalDependency)
- @ruvector/router ^0.1.30 (OptionalDependency)
- @ruvector/router-linux-x64-gnu ^0.1.30 (OptionalDependency)
- @ruvector/sona ^0.1.5 (OptionalDependency)
- agentdb ^3.0.0-alpha.17 (OptionalDependency)
- agentic-flow ^2.0.14 (OptionalDependency)
- better-sqlite3 12.9.0 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** claude-flow
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 3.38.12
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-08-15T15:41:11.989Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-05T03:55:38.714Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T04:22:43.383Z
- **Known versions:** 125
- **Latest version:** 3.80.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Ruflo - Enterprise AI agent orchestration for Claude Code. Deploy 60+ specialized agents in coordinated swarms with self-learning, fault-tolerant consensus, vector memory, and MCP integration
- **Author:** RuvNet
- **Maintainers:** ruvnet
- **Keywords:** ruvflow, claude, claude-code, anthropic, ai, ai-agents, multi-agent, agent-orchestration, swarm-intelligence, swarm, mcp, model-context-protocol
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 1797
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 14,188,572 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/claude-flow/v/3.38.12>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/ruvnet/claude-flow>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/ruvnet/claude-flow#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/ruvnet/claude-flow/issues>)
