claude-multiacc@2.0.34
Unified Claude Code and OpenAI Codex subscription pooling with quota-aware selection.
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook can configure a package-owned CLI shim during global installation, creating an extension lifecycle risk. Its gates and the inspected command-shim behavior do not establish a malicious attack, so warn rather than block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest registers a postinstall hook.
- Postinstall runs setup only for global installs, with skip gates for CI, local installs, and an opt-out variable.
- The installer places the package shim first on PATH, enabling it to handle Claude or Codex commands.
- The package describes the setup as a PATH shim and addon; the reviewed evidence does not establish a separate malicious action.
- The Codex shim locates and delegates to the real Codex binary.
- The install-time setup is gated and can be skipped.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgThe manifest registers a postinstall hook.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L56Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to claude-multiacc@2.0.34.
See all versions of claude-multiacc for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of claude-multiacc@2.0.34 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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