claude-multiacc@2.0.44
Unified Claude Code and OpenAI Codex subscription pooling with quota-aware selection.
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe install-time behavior is gated to global installs and implements this package’s command-shim setup, a lifecycle risk that warrants a warning. Inspected source did not establish payload execution, credential exfiltration, or other concrete attack behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs a postinstall script.
- The postinstall proceeds only for global installs, skips CI and supports an explicit skip flag, then runs install.sh.
- The installer places its shim first in PATH to route Claude and Codex commands through the account manager.
- The test finding’s base64 sample is a one-byte image fixture used in test data.
- The launcher identifies itself as an account-pool manager.
- The postinstall has global-install and CI gates, and reports manual setup if installation fails.
- The inspected test sample is ordinary fixture data; no payload behavior was established from it.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to claude-multiacc@2.0.44.
See all versions of claude-multiacc for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of claude-multiacc@2.0.44 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.