claude-recall@0.45.0

⚠ Under review

Persistent memory for Claude Code and Pi with native Skills integration, automatic capture, failure learning, and project scoping

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected postinstall behavior repairs only recognized Claude Recall hook commands, and the supplied agent integration locations show package-aligned storage and setup behavior. The declared Anthropic SDK is imported by an API-key-gated classifier, but its selected source was unresolved, so the review cannot clear the package.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Package installation runs the postinstall repair; classifier code can load the Anthropic SDK when an API key is present.

Impact

No malicious effect was verified, but the selected SDK dependency remains unreviewed.

Mechanism

The repair scans Claude settings and targets recognized Claude Recall hook commands; the classifier imports the declared SDK behind an API-key check.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/hooks/llm-classifier.jsscripts/postinstall.jsdist/cli/commands/repair.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 80.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.

AI review observations

The postinstall hook runs an automatic repair across Claude settings; repair filters for Claude Recall commands and proposes changes only for broken or outdated Claude Recall hook paths.
Repair rewrites only a command that still matches the scanned value and saves a backup before writing settings.
The reviewed agent integration locations point to Claude project setup, repair scanning, Claude memory storage, and generated project skills.
The Anthropic SDK is imported by the classifier only when the API key is present; its declared dependency source could not be resolved in this review.

Evidence against

The unresolved Anthropic SDK source prevents a clean clearance of the selected dependency, although the inspected package source did not establish malicious behavior.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStrings

Source & flagged code

20 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 13-53json

13 "skills/",

14 "scripts/postinstall.js",

15 "scripts/uninstall.js",

16 "README.md",

17 "LICENSE",

18 "docs/"

19 ],

20 "pi": {

21 "extensions": [

22 "./dist/pi/extension.js"

23 ],

24 "skills": [

25 "./skills/*.md"

26 ]

27 },

28 "directories": {

29 "doc": "docs",

30 "test": "tests"

31 },

32 "scripts": {

33 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js || true",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L33

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L33

34 "test": "jest",

35 "test:watch": "jest --watch",

36 "test:unit": "jest tests/unit",

37 "test:integration": "jest tests/integration",

38 "test:mcp": "jest tests/mcp",

39 "test:watch:unit": "jest --watch tests/unit",

40 "test:coverage": "jest --coverage",

41 "test:coverage:unit": "jest --coverage --maxWorkers=50% tests/unit",

42 "test:coverage:integration": "jest --coverage --maxWorkers=50% tests/integration",

43 "test:benchmarks": "jest tests/benchmarks",

44 "bench:retrieval": "ts-node tests/benchmarks/retrieval-benchmark.ts",

45 "test:experimental": "jest tests/experimental",

46 "build": "tsc && mkdir -p dist/memory dist/config && cp src/memory/schema.sql dist/memory/ && (cp -r src/config/* dist/config/ 2>/dev/null || true) && chmod +x dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.js",

47 "build:cli": "tsc && chmod +x dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.js",

48 "dev": "ts-node",

49 "start": "ts-node src/server.ts",

50 "start:dev": "nodemon --exec ts-node src/server.ts",

51 "claude-recall": "ts-node src/cli/claude-recall-cli.ts",

52 "install:global": "npm run build && npm link",

53 "stats": "npm run claude-recall stats",

scripts/postinstall.jsView file

Lines 1-33javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3const fs = require('fs');

4const path = require('path');

5const os

dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.jsView file

•path = dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.js kind = trigger_reachable_excluded_payload sizeBytes = 116932 triggerReachableSource = dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.js excludedPayload = .claude/hooks/search_enforcer.py

Critical

Trigger Reachable Excluded Directory Payload

A package entrypoint or install-reachable source explicitly loads and activates an executable-looking payload from a test, fixture, or hidden path.

dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.jsView on unpkg

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. process.exit(1); } } truncatecontent(content) { const str = typeof content === 'string' ? content : json.stringify(content); const maxlength = 100; if (str.length <= maxlength) return str; return str.substring(0, maxlength) + '...'; } } function getversion() { try { const packagejson = json.parse(fs.readfilesync(path.join(__dirname, '../../package.json'), 'utf-8')); return packagejson.version; } catch (error) { return '0.3.0'; } } async function main() { program .name('claude-recall') .descr

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = token_shingles matchedPackage = claude-recall@0.38.0 matchedPath = dist/cli/claude-recall-cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXJlY2FsbA:0.38.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 48 summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source

.claude/hooks/search_enforcer.pyView file

•path = .claude/hooks/search_enforcer.py kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 10876 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.claude/hooks/search_enforcer.pyView on unpkg

•path = .claude/hooks/search_enforcer.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 10876 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.claude/hooks/search_enforcer.pyView on unpkg

dist/cli/commands/hook-commands.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 5

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cli/commands/hook-commands.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/hooks/kiro-hooks.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = claude-recall@0.38.0 matchedPath = dist/hooks/kiro-hooks.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXJlY2FsbA:0.38.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High