--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/claude-token-saver/v/3.11.2" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/claude-token-saver/v/3.11.2.md" package: "claude-token-saver" report_status: "published" title: "claude-token-saver@3.11.2 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "3.11.2" --- # claude-token-saver@3.11.2 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 3.11.2 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The automatic install modifies Claude Code integration files and registers package commands, creating a guarded first-party extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source does not establish concrete malicious behavior, so this warrants a warning rather than a block. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-12T09:08:09.314Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-12T09:08:53.786Z - **Download time:** 516 ms - **Static scan time:** 563 ms - **AI review time:** 43392 ms - **Total time:** 44472 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The automatic postinstall runs first-party Claude Code setup that adds a skill and hooks and configures a status line. - **Trigger:** Installing the package through npm triggers postinstall. - **Impact:** Claude Code may invoke the package’s commands during later sessions. This is a guarded first-party extension lifecycle risk; no separate confirmed attack was identified. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/cli.js, src/commands/install.js, src/installer.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T09:08:53.786Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI install command writes the package-owned skill and updates Claude Code settings with status-line and hook entries, without a separate confirmation step. - **Rationale:** The automatic install modifies Claude Code integration files and registers package commands, creating a guarded first-party extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source does not establish concrete malicious behavior, so this warrants a warning rather than a block. - **Files touched:** ~/.claude/skills/claude-token-saver/SKILL.md, ~/.claude/settings.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The postinstall hook automatically runs the CLI install command., That command installs a package-owned Claude Code skill, status line, and session and prompt hooks., The installer writes Claude Code settings and adds package commands to its hooks., The setup has no confirmation prompt; its writes are limited to this package’s integration and preserve unrelated hook entries. - **Evidence against:** The inspected install behavior is first-party Claude Code integration setup; no credential collection, unrelated network recipient, or payload execution was identified. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to claude-token-saver@3.11.2. - Review the evidence and your use of claude-token-saver@3.11.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** bin/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L136: L137: // Subcommand: harness — manage the project's CLAUDE.md harness rules. L138: // claude-token-saver harness init # write CLAUDE.md (5 sections) + ratchet.md L139: // claude-token-saver harness uninit # remove harness block from CLAUDE.md (backup kept) L140: // claude-token-saver harness check # show 🅷 N/5 + which sections are missing ... L151: // claude-token-saver compact-window # status L152: // claude-token-saver compact-window set --global # pin 200k (~/.claude/settings.json) L153: // claude-token-saver compact-window set --project # pin 200k (/.claude/settings.json) L154: // claude-token-saver compact-window off | on # toggle the status ``` ### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 8. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 9. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** examples/statusline-command.ps1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = examples/statusline-command.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1619 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 10. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 11. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** src/advice.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1 ``` ### 12. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** src/model-alias.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = claude-token-saver@3.4.3 matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXRva2VuLXNhdmVy:3.4.3 similarity = 0.615 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** claude-token-saver - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 3.11.2 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-21T08:20:16.332Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T07:43:10.214Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-12T09:10:55.293Z - **Known versions:** 44 - **Latest version:** 3.50.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Route the easy work your expensive Claude model keeps repeating down to haiku/sonnet — post-hoc session analysis, no realtime router, no extra LLM calls. - **Deprecated:** Renamed to sprag-cli. This name stopped receiving updates at 3.55.0; install sprag-cli for current releases: npm uninstall -g claude-token-saver && npm i -g sprag-cli - **Author:** DeepPulse - **Maintainers:** root.studio.yaml - **Keywords:** claude, claude-code, anthropic, model-routing, llm-router, delegation, subagent, haiku, cost-savings, token-usage, prompt-caching, cache - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18 - **Artifact files:** 52 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 488,467 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()