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claude-token-saver@3.40.0: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / claude-token-saver / 3.40.0

claude-token-saver@3.40.0

Route the easy work your expensive Claude model keeps repeating down to haiku/sonnet — post-hoc session analysis, no realtime router, no extra LLM calls.

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Installing the package automatically modifies the user's Claude Code configuration and creates hooks that run this package during agent sessions. This broad agent control-surface change occurs without interactive consent in postinstall.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm installation or upgrade

Impact

Future Claude Code sessions execute package commands and receive package-authored hook output.

Mechanism

postinstall writes Claude Code settings, hooks, and a package-controlled skill

Attack narrative

The postinstall hook invokes the installer. In unattended installs, including postinstall, the installer uses automatic defaults rather than asking the user. It writes a package-controlled skill and adds SessionStart and UserPromptSubmit command hooks to the user's Claude Code settings, causing package commands to run in later agent sessions. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface.

AI rationale

The package automatically installs persistent Claude Code hooks and a controlled skill during npm postinstall, while explicitly bypassing prompts when unattended. That is concrete install-hook abuse under the stated policy.

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/commands/install.jssrc/installer.js~/.claude/settings.json~/.claude/skills/claude-token-saver/SKILL.md~/.claude/commands/token-monitor.md

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

18 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

src/doc2md.cjsView file

28const crypto = require('node:crypto'); L29: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L30: const ledger = require('./doc2md-ledger.cjs');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L28

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = claude-token-saver@3.39.0 matchedPath = src/doc2md.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXRva2VuLXNhdmVy:3.39.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg

24L25: const fs = require('node:fs'); L26: const os = require('node:os');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L24

src/commands/upgrade.jsView file

20// resolution to find the same npm that installed us. L21: const child = spawn(cmd, { shell: true, stdio: 'inherit' }); L22: child.on('close', (code) => resolve(code === null ? 1 : code));

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/commands/upgrade.jsView on unpkg · L20

src/seed-rules.jsView file

53try { L54: const data = JSON.parse(readFileSync(seedStatePath(), 'utf8')); L55: return data && typeof data.decided === 'object' && data.decided ? data : { decided: {} };

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/seed-rules.jsView on unpkg · L53

src/commands/feedback.jsView file

56if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L56

21L22: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L23: import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L28: const REPO = 'rootstudioyaml/claude-token-saver'; L29: const ISSUES_URL = `https://github.com/${REPO}/issues`; L30: ... L47: `version: ${version}`, L48: `os: ${process.platform} ${os.release()}`, L49: `node: ${process.version}`, ... L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop();

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L21

56Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/cli.js -> src/commands/feedback.js L56: if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

bin/cli.jsView file

10Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L104: claude-token-saver uninstall remove everything install added L105: claude-token-saver harness check score the harness setup in CLAUDE.md L106: claude-token-saver harness analyze run the harness transcript analysis manually ... L251: L252: // Subcommand: harness — manage the project's CLAUDE.md harness rules. L253: // claude-token-saver harness init # write CLAUDE.md (5 sections) + ratchet.md L254: // claude-token-saver harness uninit # remove harness block from CLAUDE.md (backup kept) L255: // claude-token-saver harness check # show 🅷 N/5 + which sections are missing ... L266: // claude-token-saver compact-window # status L267: // claude-token-saver comp

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg · L10

examples/statusline-command.ps1View file

•path = examples/statusline-command.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1619 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

examples/statusline-command.ps1View on unpkg

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

src/korean-style.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = claude-token-saver@3.39.0 matchedPath = src/korean-style.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXRva2VuLXNhdmVy:3.39.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/korean-style.jsView on unpkg

src/litellm-budget.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = claude-token-saver@3.39.0 matchedPath = src/litellm-budget.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXRva2VuLXNhdmVy:3.39.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/litellm-budget.jsView on unpkg

src/update-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = claude-token-saver@3.39.0 matchedPath = src/update-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXRva2VuLXNhdmVy:3.39.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/update-check.jsView on unpkg

src/model-alias.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = claude-token-saver@3.39.0 matchedPath = src/model-alias.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xhdWRlLXRva2VuLXNhdmVy:3.39.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/model-alias.jsView on unpkg