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claude-token-saver@3.40.1: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / claude-token-saver / 3.40.1

claude-token-saver@3.40.1

Route the easy work your expensive Claude model keeps repeating down to haiku/sonnet — post-hoc session analysis, no realtime router, no extra LLM calls.

AI Security Review

scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package automatically changes global Claude Code configuration and instructions. These changes cause package commands and guidance to run across future Claude Code sessions.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm postinstall during package installation

Impact

The package gains persistent influence over Claude Code startup and prompt processing without an interactive consent step.

Mechanism

automatic global Claude Code hook and instruction installation

Policy narrative

The package's postinstall invokes its install command. In unattended installs, that command continues with defaults, installs hooks in the user's global Claude Code settings, and adds global CLAUDE.md guidance. This persists beyond the npm install and affects future agent sessions, making it an unconsented mutation of a broad foreign AI-agent control surface.

AI rationale

The automatic postinstall modifies global Claude Code hooks and instructions without interactive consent. That meets the policy boundary for malicious install-hook abuse despite the package using readable, package-named commands.

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/commands/install.jssrc/installer.js~/.claude/settings.json~/.claude/skills/claude-token-saver/SKILL.md~/.claude/CLAUDE.md~/.claude/ratchet.md

Source & flagged code

19 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

src/doc2md.cjsView file

28const crypto = require('node:crypto'); L29: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L30: const ledger = require('./doc2md-ledger.cjs');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L28

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.40.0 matchedPath = src/doc2md.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.40.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 068e0241afcc4e8f signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.40.0 matchedPath = src/doc2md.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.40.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 45 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg

24L25: const fs = require('node:fs'); L26: const os = require('node:os');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L24

src/commands/upgrade.jsView file

20// resolution to find the same npm that installed us. L21: const child = spawn(cmd, { shell: true, stdio: 'inherit' }); L22: child.on('close', (code) => resolve(code === null ? 1 : code));

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/commands/upgrade.jsView on unpkg · L20

src/seed-rules.jsView file

53try { L54: const data = JSON.parse(readFileSync(seedStatePath(), 'utf8')); L55: return data && typeof data.decided === 'object' && data.decided ? data : { decided: {} };

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/seed-rules.jsView on unpkg · L53

src/commands/feedback.jsView file

56if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L56

21L22: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L23: import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L28: const REPO = 'rootstudioyaml/claude-token-saver'; L29: const ISSUES_URL = `https://github.com/${REPO}/issues`; L30: ... L47: `version: ${version}`, L48: `os: ${process.platform} ${os.release()}`, L49: `node: ${process.version}`, ... L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop();

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L21

56Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/cli.js -> src/commands/feedback.js L56: if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

bin/cli.jsView file

10Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L104: claude-token-saver uninstall remove everything install added L105: claude-token-saver harness check score the harness setup in CLAUDE.md L106: claude-token-saver harness analyze run the harness transcript analysis manually ... L251: L252: // Subcommand: harness — manage the project's CLAUDE.md harness rules. L253: // claude-token-saver harness init # write CLAUDE.md (5 sections) + ratchet.md L254: // claude-token-saver harness uninit # remove harness block from CLAUDE.md (backup kept) L255: // claude-token-saver harness check # show 🅷 N/5 + which sections are missing ... L266: // claude-token-saver compact-window # status L267: // claude-token-saver comp

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg · L10

examples/statusline-command.ps1View file

•path = examples/statusline-command.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1619 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

examples/statusline-command.ps1View on unpkg

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

src/korean-style.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.40.0 matchedPath = src/korean-style.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.40.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/korean-style.jsView on unpkg

src/litellm-budget.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.40.0 matchedPath = src/litellm-budget.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.40.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/litellm-budget.jsView on unpkg

src/update-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.40.0 matchedPath = src/update-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.40.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/update-check.jsView on unpkg

src/model-alias.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.40.0 matchedPath = src/model-alias.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.40.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/model-alias.jsView on unpkg