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claude-token-saver@3.42.1: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / claude-token-saver / 3.42.1

claude-token-saver@3.42.1

Legacy name of sprag-cli (Sprag) - same tool, kept publishing so existing installs stay current. Prefer: npm i -g sprag-cli

AI Security Review

scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Npm installation automatically changes the user's global Claude Code control surface. It installs package-controlled instructions and persistent hooks that run in future sessions.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package, including as a dependency, runs postinstall.

Impact

The package gains recurring execution and can influence Claude Code behavior across projects without an interactive consent step.

Mechanism

Automatic global Claude Code skill, settings-hook, statusline, and instruction injection.

Policy narrative

The postinstall hook launches the install command. In unattended installs, the command proceeds without prompting, writes a package-controlled skill, adds SessionStart and UserPromptSubmit commands to the global Claude Code settings, and invokes global harness setup. That setup appends instructions to the Claude Code file used across projects and creates imported rule files. These persistent AI-agent control-surface changes occur merely by installing the npm package.

AI rationale

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The package establishes persistent commands and global instructions, so it meets the blocking install-hook-abuse policy.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/cli.jssrc/commands/install.jssrc/installer.jssrc/harness.js~/.claude/skills/claude-token-saver/SKILL.md~/.claude/settings.json

Source & flagged code

19 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/cli.js install || true

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

src/doc2md.cjsView file

28const crypto = require('node:crypto'); L29: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L30: const ledger = require('./doc2md-ledger.cjs');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L28

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.42.1 matchedPath = src/doc2md.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.42.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 6420f5cb161d8193 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.42.1 matchedPath = src/doc2md.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.42.1 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 45 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg

24L25: const fs = require('node:fs'); L26: const os = require('node:os');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

src/doc2md.cjsView on unpkg · L24

src/commands/upgrade.jsView file

20// resolution to find the same npm that installed us. L21: const child = spawn(cmd, { shell: true, stdio: 'inherit' }); L22: child.on('close', (code) => resolve(code === null ? 1 : code));

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/commands/upgrade.jsView on unpkg · L20

src/seed-rules.jsView file

53try { L54: const data = JSON.parse(readFileSync(seedStatePath(), 'utf8')); L55: return data && typeof data.decided === 'object' && data.decided ? data : { decided: {} };

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/seed-rules.jsView on unpkg · L53

src/commands/feedback.jsView file

56if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L56

21L22: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L23: import { writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L28: const REPO = 'rootstudioyaml/sprag'; L29: const ISSUES_URL = `https://github.com/${REPO}/issues`; L30: ... L47: `version: ${version}`, L48: `os: ${process.platform} ${os.release()}`, L49: `node: ${process.version}`, ... L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop();

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

src/commands/feedback.jsView on unpkg · L21

56Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/cli.js -> src/commands/feedback.js L56: if (auth.status !== 0) return null; L57: const res = spawnSync('gh', ['issue', 'create', '-R', REPO, '--title', title, '--body', body], L58: { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 30_000 }); L59: if (res.status !== 0) { debug('feedback:gh', res.stderr); return null; } L60: const url = String(res.stdout).trim().split('\n').pop(); ... L67: try { L68: const params = new URLSearchParams(); L69: params.set(FORM.message, `${title}\n\n${body}`); L70: params.set(FORM.meta, meta); L71: const res = await fetch(`https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/${FORM.id}/formResponse`, { L72: method: 'POST',

bin/cli.jsView file

10Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L104: sprag uninstall remove everything install added L105: sprag harness check score the harness setup in CLAUDE.md L106: sprag harness analyze run the harness transcript analysis manually ... L251: L252: // Subcommand: harness — manage the project's CLAUDE.md harness rules. L253: // sprag harness init # write CLAUDE.md (5 sections) + ratchet.md L254: // sprag harness uninit # remove harness block from CLAUDE.md (backup kept) L255: // sprag harness check # show 🅷 N/5 + which sections are missing ... L266: // sprag compact-window # status L267: // sprag compact-window set --global # pin 200k (~/.claude/settings.json) L268: // sprag compact-window set --p

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg · L10

examples/statusline-command.ps1View file

•path = examples/statusline-command.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1619 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

examples/statusline-command.ps1View on unpkg

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

src/advice.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

src/korean-style.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.42.1 matchedPath = src/korean-style.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.42.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/korean-style.jsView on unpkg

src/update-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.42.1 matchedPath = src/update-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.42.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/update-check.jsView on unpkg

src/litellm-budget.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.42.1 matchedPath = src/litellm-budget.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.42.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/litellm-budget.jsView on unpkg

src/model-alias.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = sprag-cli@3.42.1 matchedPath = src/model-alias.js matchedIdentity = npm:c3ByYWctY2xp:3.42.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/model-alias.jsView on unpkg