registry / clawvet / 0.7.5

clawvet@0.7.5

Skill vetting & supply chain security for OpenClaw. Scans SKILL.md files for prompt injection, credential theft, RCE, typosquatting, and social engineering.

Static Scan Results

scanned 2h ago · by rust-scanner

Static analysis flagged 9 finding(s) at 72.0% confidence. This version is warn-only unless an AI or security-team review confirms malicious behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Decision evidence

public snapshot

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 60.8 KB of source, external domains: bazzzz--0ab7a9301f3911f1ab9942dde27851f2.web.val.run, clawhub.ai, github.com, img.shields.io, raw.githubusercontent.com, tally.so

Source & flagged code

1 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 1-25javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3// src/index.ts

4import { Command } from "commander";

5import { readFileSync as readFileSync6 } from "fs";

6import { execFile } from "child_process";

7import { fileURLToPath } from "url";

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5

8import { dirname as dirname4, join as join6 } from "path";

10// src/commands/scan.ts

11import { readFileSync as readFileSync2, existsSync as existsSync2, statSync } from "fs";

12import { resolve, join as join2, basename, dirname } from "path";

13import chalk2 from "chalk";

15// ../shared/src/patterns.ts

16function re(parts, flags) {

17 return new RegExp(parts.join(""), flags);

18}

19var THREAT_PATTERNS = [

20 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

21 // CRITICAL: Remote code execution

22 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

23 {

24 name: "CURL_PIPE_BASH",

25 pattern: re(["curl\\s+.*\\|\\s*(ba)?", "sh"], "gi"),

Source & flagged code

1 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

5import { readFileSync as readFileSync6 } from "fs"; L6: import { execFile } from "child_process"; L7: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; ... L50: codeOnly: true, L51: fix: "Replace dynamic evaluation with a safer alternative like JSON.parse() or a sandboxed environment." L52: }, ... L163: name: "SSH_KEY_ACCESS", L164: pattern: /~\/\.ssh\/id_|\.pem\b|BEGIN\s+(RSA\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY/gi, L165: severity: "high", ... L289: codeOnly: true, L290: fix: "Use standard HTTP libraries (fetch, axios) instead of raw sockets for network communication." L291: },

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5

Findings

1 High3 Medium5 Low

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

1 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 1-25javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3// src/index.ts

4import { Command } from "commander";

5import { readFileSync as readFileSync6 } from "fs";

6import { execFile } from "child_process";

7import { fileURLToPath } from "url";

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5

8import { dirname as dirname4, join as join6 } from "path";

10// src/commands/scan.ts

11import { readFileSync as readFileSync2, existsSync as existsSync2, statSync } from "fs";

12import { resolve, join as join2, basename, dirname } from "path";

13import chalk2 from "chalk";

15// ../shared/src/patterns.ts

16function re(parts, flags) {

17 return new RegExp(parts.join(""), flags);

18}

19var THREAT_PATTERNS = [

20 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

21 // CRITICAL: Remote code execution

22 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

23 {

24 name: "CURL_PIPE_BASH",

25 pattern: re(["curl\\s+.*\\|\\s*(ba)?", "sh"], "gi"),