---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/cli-jaw/v/2.17.47"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/cli-jaw/v/2.17.47.md"
package: "cli-jaw"
report_status: "published"
title: "cli-jaw@2.17.47 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "2.17.47"
---

# cli-jaw@2.17.47 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — A remote publisher can execute changed installer content and alter the user's global tool and skill environment.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Install Hook Abuse
- **Selected version:** 2.17.47
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Installing the package automatically downloads and executes remote installer scripts, installs global tools, and imports remote skills. These actions occur before the user runs the CLI.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-11T08:57:46.633Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-11T08:59:44.800Z
- **Download time:** 767 ms
- **Static scan time:** 17645 ms
- **AI review time:** 99751 ms
- **Total time:** 118167 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Installing the package automatically downloads and executes remote installer scripts, installs global tools, and imports remote skills. These actions occur before the user runs the CLI.

- **Trigger:** npm installation with lifecycle scripts enabled.

- **Impact:** A remote publisher can execute changed installer content and alter the user's global tool and skill environment.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs, dist/bin/postinstall.js, dist/lib/mcp/skills-distribution.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-11T08:59:44.800Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Postinstall remote-script execution and unprompted global dependency installation.

- **Attack narrative:** During npm postinstall, the guard runs the compiled installer. Unless an opt-out variable is set, it installs Claude by downloading a script and running it with bash. It also clones a mutable GitHub skills repository, copies or replaces skill directories, installs MCP tooling globally, and installs missing skill dependencies, including remote scripts. These side effects occur without an interactive confirmation.

- **Rationale:** The automatic lifecycle chain executes mutable remote code and changes global tooling and skills without consent. This is concrete install-hook abuse, not merely user-invoked setup.

- **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs, dist/bin/postinstall.js, dist/lib/mcp/skills-distribution.js, ~/.cli-jaw/skills, ~/.cli-jaw/skills\_ref, ~/.cli-jaw/mcp.json

- **Network endpoints:** https://claude.ai/install.sh, https://github.com/lidge-jun/cli-jaw-skills.git, https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 99.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The manifest runs a postinstall hook automatically., The postinstall guard imports and runs the compiled installer., Claude installation is enabled unless the user sets an opt-out variable., The installer downloads a remote script and executes it with bash., Installation clones remote skills and replaces local skill directories., The lifecycle also installs global MCP and missing skill dependencies without prompting., The postinstall helper downloads its configured remote script to a temporary file., Skill distribution fetches the latest skills by cloning a remote GitHub repository.

- **Evidence against:** Shared agent-path migration requires an explicit environment opt-in., No credential harvesting or data exfiltration was found in the inspected paths.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to cli-jaw@2.17.47.

- Avoid installing cli-jaw@2.17.47. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/postinstall.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L24: import os from 'os';
L25: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
L26: import { ensureSharedHomeSkillsLinks, initMcpConfig, copyDefaultSkills, propagateSkillsToInstances, migrateAllJawHomes, loadUnifiedMcp, saveUnifiedMcp } from '../lib/mcp-sync.js';
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/postinstall.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L180: function persistWindowsUserPathDir(dir) {
L181: const ps = process.env["SystemRoot"] ? path.join(process.env["SystemRoot"], 'System32', 'WindowsPowerShell', 'v1.0', 'powershell.exe') : 'powershell';
L182: const script = `
```

### 6. Low: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 45.0%
- **Path:** dist/src/browser/adaptive-fetch/defuddle-extractor.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/src/browser/adaptive-fetch/defuddle-extractor.js>)

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L98: // eslint-disable-next-line no-new-func -- vendored bundle injection on CSP-strict pages
L99: new Function(src)();
L100: }, source);
```

### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** scripts/staging-cleanup.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/scripts/staging-cleanup.cjs>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L9: */
L10: const fs = require('fs');
L11: const path = require('path');
```

### 8. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** dist/src/ide/diff.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/src/ide/diff.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: */
L8: import { execFileSync, execFile } from 'node:child_process';
L9: import { writeFileSync, mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, statSync, realpathSync, rmSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
...
L139: // Antigravity: 여러 env 시그널 확인 (VS Code 포크라서 VSCODE_* 도 공존)
L140: if (process.env["ANTIGRAVITY_AGENT"] === '1')
L141: return 'antigravity';
```

### 9. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 10. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 11. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/launchd.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/launchd.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L9: */
L10: import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
L11: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs';
...
L16: import { asRecord, errString } from '../_http-client.js';
L17: if (process.argv[2] === 'launchd' && !process.env["_CLI_JAW_SERVICE_DELEGATE"]) {
L18: console.error('  ⚠️  jaw launchd is deprecated. Use jaw service instead (cross-platform).');
...
L42: const LABEL = `com.cli-jaw.${INSTANCE}`;
L43: const PLIST_PATH = join(homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents', `${LABEL}.plist`);
L44: const LOG_DIR = join(JAW_HOME, 'logs');
...
L75: try {
L76: execSync(`launchctl print ${GUI_DOMAIN}/${LABEL}`, { stdio: 'pipe' });
L77: return true;
```

### 12. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 13. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/doctor.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/doctor.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L565: const installHint = process.platform === 'win32'
L566: ? 'powershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex"'
L567: : 'curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh';
...
L576: // works, so it has to ask the question against `getconf PATH` instead of
L577: // process.env.PATH.
L578: if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
```

### 14. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/postinstall.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5: console.error(`[jaw:init] ❌ Node.js >= 22 required (current: ${process.version})`);
L6: console.error(`[jaw:init]    Install: https://nodejs.org or nvm install 22`);
L7: process.exit(1);
...
L24: import os from 'os';
L25: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
L26: import { ensureSharedHomeSkillsLinks, initMcpConfig, copyDefaultSkills, propagateSkillsToInstances, migrateAllJawHomes, loadUnifiedMcp, saveUnifiedMcp } from '../lib/mcp-sync.js';
...
L29: let execFileAdapter = execFileSync;
L30: let toolPlatform = process.platform;
L31: /** Test seam. Returns a restore function. Not for production use. */
...
L61: const JAW_HOME = (() => {
L62: if (!process.env["CLI_JAW_HOME"])
L63: return path.join(os.homedir(), '.cli-jaw');
```

### 15. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/skill.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/skill.js>)

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
import { readfilesync, writefilesync, existssync, mkdirsync, rmsync, cpsync } from 'node:fs';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { execsync } from 'node:child_process';
import { jaw_home, skills_dir } from '../../src/core/config.js';
import { dedupeskilldirentries } from '../../lib/mcp/sk[redacted]';
import { resolveskillid, legacyskillidnotice } from '../../lib/mcp/sk[redacted]';
const codex_skills = join(homedir(), '.codex', 'skills');
const ref_dir = join(jaw_home, 'skills_ref');
                                                                                                                              
const c = {
    reset: '\x1b[0m
```

### 16. Critical: Trojan Source Unicode
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** public/dist/assets/MilkdownWysiwygEditor-D6JaLDE4.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/public/dist/assets/MilkdownWysiwygEditor-D6JaLDE4.js>)

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L142: contains invisible/control Unicode U+FEFF (zero width no-break space)
`,this.pos),this.lineEndPos=e),e===-1?this.atEnd?this.buffer.substring(this.pos):null:(this.buffer[e-1]===`\r`&&--e,this.buffer.substring(this.pos,e))}hasChars(e){return this.pos+e<=this.buffer.length}setNext(e){return this.buffer=this.buff
```

### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/launchd.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/launchd.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/bin/cli-jaw.js -> dist/bin/commands/launchd.js
L9: */
L10: import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
L11: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs';
...
L16: import { asRecord, errString } from '../_http-client.js';
L17: if (process.argv[2] === 'launchd' && !process.env["_CLI_JAW_SERVICE_DELEGATE"]) {
L18: console.error('  ⚠️  jaw launchd is deprecated. Use jaw service instead (cross-platform).');
...
L42: const LABEL = `com.cli-jaw.${INSTANCE}`;
L43: const PLIST_PATH = join(homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents', `${LABEL}.plist`);
L44: const LOG_DIR = join(JAW_HOME, 'logs');
...
L75: try {
L76: execSync(`launchctl print ${GUI_DOMAIN}/${LABEL}`, { stdio: 'pipe' });
L77: return tru
```

### 18. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/mcp.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/mcp.js>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L11: * Package detection:
L12: *   npm:  @scope/name or name          → npm i -g <pkg>
L13: *   pypi: name (with --pypi flag)      → uv tool install <pkg> / pip install <pkg>
...
L15: */
L16: import { execSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L17: import { readFileSync, existsSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
```

### 19. Medium: Protestware
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 90.0%

Package source has broad protestware-like patterns that need review.

### 20. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 21. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 22. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** scripts/check-deps-online.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/scripts/check-deps-online.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = scripts/check-deps-online.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 912
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 23. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 24. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/clone.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/clone.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 30
```

### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/service.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/service.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/bin/commands/service.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/src/agent/pi-runtime.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/src/agent/pi-runtime.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/src/agent/pi-runtime.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/src/cli/capability-probe-worker.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/src/cli/capability-probe-worker.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/src/cli/capability-probe-worker.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/src/routes/quota.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/src/routes/quota.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/src/routes/quota.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/chat.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/chat.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/bin/commands/chat.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/dashboard.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/dashboard.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/bin/commands/dashboard.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 32. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/commands/launchd.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/commands/launchd.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/bin/commands/launchd.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 33. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/bin/postinstall.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/bin/postinstall.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 34. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/lib/mcp/skills-distribution.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/lib/mcp/skills-distribution.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/lib/mcp/sk[redacted]
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 35. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/lib/mcp/skills-reset.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/lib/mcp/skills-reset.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/lib/mcp/sk[redacted]
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 36. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/lib/quota-copilot.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/cli-jaw@2.17.47/dist/lib/quota-copilot.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.17.43
matchedPath = dist/lib/quota-copilot.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.17.43
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 49
- **Optional dependencies:** 1
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 16
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 50

### Published dependency entries
- @codemirror/autocomplete ^6.20.1 (Dependency)
- @codemirror/lang-markdown ^6.5.0 (Dependency)
- @codemirror/language ^6.12.3 (Dependency)
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## Package metadata
- **Package:** cli-jaw
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.17.47
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-11T08:55:52.117Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-03T17:24:19.448Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-07T20:57:28.420Z
- **Known versions:** 51
- **Latest version:** 2.17.71
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Personal AI assistant powered by Pi, Antigravity, Claude, Codex, Codex App, Cursor, Grok, Kiro, OpenCode, and Copilot — Web, Terminal, Slack, Telegram, and Discord interfaces with 33 skills active by default from a 230-skill reference library
- **Author:** CLI-JAW Contributors
- **Keywords:** ai-assistant, cli, antigravity, claude, codex, cursor, gemini, grok, pi, copilot, multi-agent, orchestration
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.4.0
- **Artifact files:** 3040
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 29,501,672 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** Yes

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/cli-jaw/v/2.17.47>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/lidge-jun/cli-jaw.git>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/lidge-jun/cli-jaw#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/lidge-jun/cli-jaw/issues>)