--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/cli-jaw/v/2.2.18" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/cli-jaw/v/2.2.18.md" package: "cli-jaw" report_status: "published" title: "cli-jaw@2.2.18 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "2.2.18" --- # cli-jaw@2.2.18 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Remote endpoint contents execute with the installing user's permissions and can install or modify local AI tooling. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 2.2.18 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) npm postinstall automatically downloads and executes a remote Claude installer, then fetches unpinned skills. This is unconsented install-time remote code execution. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-12T03:34:25.279Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-12T03:36:22.878Z - **Download time:** 761 ms - **Static scan time:** 9623 ms - **AI review time:** 107213 ms - **Total time:** 117599 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** npm postinstall automatically downloads and executes a remote Claude installer, then fetches unpinned skills. This is unconsented install-time remote code execution. - **Trigger:** npm installation with lifecycle scripts enabled and without JAW\_SAFE or CLI\_JAW\_SKIP\_CLAUDE. - **Impact:** Remote endpoint contents execute with the installing user's permissions and can install or modify local AI tooling. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs, dist/bin/postinstall.js, dist/lib/mcp/skills-distribution.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-12T03:36:22.878Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** postinstall curl/Powershell download followed by shell execution - **Attack narrative:** During npm postinstall, the guard imports and runs the compiled postinstall handler. In normal mode it invokes the Claude native installer by default: Unix downloads a script to a temporary file and runs bash; Windows evaluates a remotely retrieved PowerShell script. It also fetches the latest skills repository during installation. These externally controlled payloads are not pinned or user-confirmed. - **Rationale:** The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall remote-code-execution chain. Vendor-named endpoints and opt-outs do not remove the install-time execution risk. - **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs, dist/bin/postinstall.js, ~/.cli-jaw/mcp.json, ~/.cli-jaw/skills\_ref - **Network endpoints:** https://claude.ai/install.sh, https://claude.ai/install.ps1, https://github.com/lidge-jun/cli-jaw-skills.git ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** package.json runs a postinstall guard., The guard invokes dist/bin/postinstall.js., Postinstall downloads and executes Claude installer scripts., Normal postinstall calls the Claude installer by default., Postinstall fetches latest skills from GitHub. - **Evidence against:** Shared agent-path migration is explicitly opt-in., Observed endpoints are named vendor/project endpoints; no credential theft found. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall-guard.cjs ``` ### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L24: import os from 'os'; L25: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; L26: import { ensureSharedHomeSkillsLinks, initMcpConfig, copyDefaultSkills, propagateSkillsToInstances, loadUnifiedMcp, saveUnifiedMcp } from '../lib/mcp-sync.js'; ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L168: function persistWindowsUserPathDir(dir) { L169: const ps = process.env["SystemRoot"] ? path.join(process.env["SystemRoot"], 'System32', 'WindowsPowerShell', 'v1.0', 'powershell.exe') : 'powershell'; L170: const script = ` ``` ### 6. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** dist/src/browser/adaptive-fetch/defuddle-extractor.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L98: // eslint-disable-next-line no-new-func -- vendored bundle injection on CSP-strict pages L99: new Function(src)(); L100: }, source); ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/src/agent/jwc-runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L31: const spec = override && override.trim() ? override.trim() : DEFAULT_JWC_SDK_SPEC; L32: sdkPromise = import(spec).catch(err => { L33: sdkPromise = null; ``` ### 8. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/src/ide/diff.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: */ L8: import { execFileSync, execFile } from 'node:child_process'; L9: import { writeFileSync, mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, statSync, realpathSync, rmSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L139: // Antigravity: 여러 env 시그널 확인 (VS Code 포크라서 VSCODE_* 도 공존) L140: if (process.env["ANTIGRAVITY_AGENT"] === '1') L141: return 'antigravity'; ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/commands/launchd.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L9: */ L10: import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; L11: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L16: import { asRecord, errString } from '../_http-client.js'; L17: if (process.argv[2] === 'launchd' && !process.env["_CLI_JAW_SERVICE_DELEGATE"]) { L18: console.error(' ⚠️ jaw launchd is deprecated. Use jaw service instead (cross-platform).'); ... L42: const LABEL = `com.cli-jaw.${INSTANCE}`; L43: const PLIST_PATH = join(homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents', `${LABEL}.plist`); L44: const LOG_DIR = join(JAW_HOME, 'logs'); ... L74: try { L75: execSync(`launchctl print ${GUI_DOMAIN}/${LABEL}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); L76: return true; ``` ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/quota-copilot.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: // L8: // Source: https://docs.github.com/copilot — official credential order L9: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; L10: import fs from 'fs'; ... L14: import { stripUndefined } from '../src/core/strip-undefined.js'; L15: const JAW_HOME = process.env["CLI_JAW_HOME"] L16: ? resolveHomePath(process.env["CLI_JAW_HOME"]) ``` ### 14. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: console.error(`[jaw:init] ❌ Node.js >= 22 required (current: ${process.version})`); L6: console.error(`[jaw:init] Install: https://nodejs.org or nvm install 22`); L7: process.exit(1); ... L24: import os from 'os'; L25: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; L26: import { ensureSharedHomeSkillsLinks, initMcpConfig, copyDefaultSkills, propagateSkillsToInstances, loadUnifiedMcp, saveUnifiedMcp } from '../lib/mcp-sync.js'; ... L29: let execFileAdapter = execFileSync; L30: let toolPlatform = process.platform; L31: /** Test seam. Returns a restore function. Not for production use. */ ... L49: const JAW_HOME = (() => { L50: if (!process.env["CLI_JAW_HOME"]) L51: return path.join(os.homedir(), '.cli-jaw'); ``` ### 15. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/commands/skill.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. import { readdirsync, readfilesync, writefilesync, existssync, mkdirsync, rmsync, cpsync } from 'node:fs'; import { join } from 'node:path'; import { homedir } from 'node:os'; import { execsync } from 'node:child_process'; import { jaw_home, skills_dir } from '../../src/core/config.js'; import { isdiscoverableskilldirname } from '../../lib/mcp/sk[redacted]'; const codex_skills = join(homedir(), '.codex', 'skills'); const ref_dir = join(jaw_home, 'skills_ref'); const c = { reset: '\x1b[0m', bold: '\x1b[1m', dim: '\x1b[2m', red: '\x1b[31m', green: ``` ### 16. Critical: Trojan Source Unicode - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** public/dist/assets/MilkdownWysiwygEditor-BKOCDI4Z.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L142: contains invisible/control Unicode U+FEFF (zero width no-break space) `,this.pos),this.lineEndPos=e),e===-1?this.atEnd?this.buffer.substring(this.pos):null:(this.buffer[e-1]===`\r`&&--e,this.buffer.substring(this.pos,e))}hasChars(e){return this.pos+e<=this.buffer.length}setNext(e){return this.buffer=this.buff ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/commands/launchd.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/bin/cli-jaw.js -> dist/bin/commands/launchd.js L9: */ L10: import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; L11: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs'; ... L16: import { asRecord, errString } from '../_http-client.js'; L17: if (process.argv[2] === 'launchd' && !process.env["_CLI_JAW_SERVICE_DELEGATE"]) { L18: console.error(' ⚠️ jaw launchd is deprecated. Use jaw service instead (cross-platform).'); ... L42: const LABEL = `com.cli-jaw.${INSTANCE}`; L43: const PLIST_PATH = join(homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents', `${LABEL}.plist`); L44: const LOG_DIR = join(JAW_HOME, 'logs'); ... L74: try { L75: execSync(`launchctl print ${GUI_DOMAIN}/${LABEL}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); L76: return tru ``` ### 18. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/commands/mcp.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: * Package detection: L12: * npm: @scope/name or name → npm i -g L13: * pypi: name (with --pypi flag) → uv tool install / pip install ... L15: */ L16: import { execSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L17: import { readFileSync, existsSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs'; ``` ### 19. Medium: Protestware - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 90.0% Package source has broad protestware-like patterns that need review. ### 20. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 21. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 22. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/check-deps-online.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = scripts/check-deps-online.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 912 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 24. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/src/browser/adaptive-fetch/vendor/defuddle.iife.min.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_trace_path_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 9 ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/commands/doctor.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.2.17 matchedPath = dist/bin/commands/doctor.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.2.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/commands/service.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.2.17 matchedPath = dist/bin/commands/service.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.2.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/scripts/fresh-install-smoke.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.2.17 matchedPath = dist/scripts/fresh-install-smoke.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.2.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/src/cli/capability-probe-worker.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.2.17 matchedPath = dist/src/cli/capability-probe-worker.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.2.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/commands/dashboard.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = cli-jaw@2.2.17 matchedPath = dist/bin/commands/dashboard.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2xpLWphdw:2.2.17 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 48 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 16 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 48 ### Published dependency entries - @codemirror/autocomplete ^6.20.1 (Dependency) - @codemirror/lang-markdown ^6.5.0 (Dependency) - @codemirror/language ^6.12.3 (Dependency) - @codemirror/language-data ^6.5.2 (Dependency) - @codemirror/state ^6.6.0 (Dependency) - @codemirror/view ^6.43.0 (Dependency) - @grammyjs/runner ^2.0.3 (Dependency) - @grammyjs/transformer-throttler ^1.2.1 (Dependency) - @lezer/highlight ^1.2.3 (Dependency) - @lucide/icons ^1.8.0 (Dependency) - @milkdown/kit ^7.20.0 (Dependency) - @replit/codemirror-vim ^6.3.0 (Dependency) - @tanstack/virtual-core ^3.13.23 (Dependency) - @uiw/react-codemirror ^4.25.9 (Dependency) - @xterm/addon-fit ^0.11.0 (Dependency) - @xterm/xterm ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - better-sqlite3 ^13.0.2 (Dependency) - d3 ^7.9.0 (Dependency) - discord.js ^14.25.1 (Dependency) - dompurify ^3.3.3 (Dependency) - eventsource ^3.0.7 (Dependency) - express ^5.2.1 (Dependency) - fast-glob ^3.3.3 (Dependency) - grammy ^1.44.0 (Dependency) - helmet ^8.1.0 (Dependency) - highlight.js ^11.11.1 (Dependency) - katex ^0.16.44 (Dependency) - marked ^18.0.0 (Dependency) - marked-highlight ^2.2.3 (Dependency) - mermaid ^11.14.0 (Dependency) - node-fetch ^3.3.2 (Dependency) - playwright-core ^1.58.2 (Dependency) - react ^19.2.5 (Dependency) - react-dom ^19.2.5 (Dependency) - react-markdown ^10.1.0 (Dependency) - rehype-katex ^7.0.1 (Dependency) - rehype-sanitize ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - remark-breaks ^4.0.0 (Dependency) - remark-frontmatter ^5.0.0 (Dependency) - remark-gfm ^4.0.1 (Dependency) - remark-math ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - remark-parse ^11.0.0 (Dependency) - sqlite-vec ^0.1.9 (Dependency) - trash ^10.1.1 (Dependency) - unified ^11.0.5 (Dependency) - unist-util-visit ^5.1.0 (Dependency) - ws ^8.18.0 (Dependency) - yaml ^2.8.4 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** cli-jaw - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 2.2.18 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-12T03:25:38.007Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-03T17:24:19.448Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-14T16:03:48.045Z - **Known versions:** 10 - **Latest version:** 2.4.4 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Personal AI assistant powered by Pi, Antigravity, AI-E, Claude, Claude E, Codex, Codex App, Cursor, Grok, Kiro, OpenCode, and Copilot — Web, Terminal, Telegram, and Discord interfaces with 107 built-in skills - **Author:** CLI-JAW Contributors - **Keywords:** ai-assistant, cli, antigravity, claude, codex, cursor, gemini, grok, pi, copilot, multi-agent, orchestration - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.4.0 - **Artifact files:** 2464 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 24,037,491 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()