coda-cli@1.5.50
NodeJS命
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic update path installs a differently named global package without a separate confirmation, creating unresolved supply chain risk. The inspected credential transfer follows the configured AI endpoint, and no concrete malicious behavior was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes bin/index.js as the coda command and declares no lifecycle scripts.
- On empty CLI input or --v, bin/index.js checks for an update; when a newer version is found, it automatically runs a global install of code-cli, using sudo on non-Windows systems.
- The agent server sends configured API keys to the configured or protocol-default AI endpoint as part of its chat request.
- The CLI install is reached through normal CLI invocation and an update check; the inspected source does not establish that code-cli is malicious or that installation runs during package installation.
- Agent-server credentials are sent to the configured or protocol-default chat endpoint, not shown going to an unrelated recipient.
- The account action matches are in the CLI command-handling path; no automatic publisher-selected account action was established.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
bin/index.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to coda-cli@1.5.50.
See all versions of coda-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of coda-cli@1.5.50 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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