codeplay-common@4.4.7
Common build scripts and files
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an unconsented lifecycle-created path to a broad AI-agent control surface and remote project-file updates. It does not meet the narrower install-time block condition because the agent-file mutation runs during the rewritten build command, not directly in a lifecycle hook.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Install hooks copy package files into the consumer project and replace its build command.
- The installed build command fetches a server-selected archive and overwrites root-level agent instruction files.
- The remote archive has path checks but no signature or hash verification, so the server controls future instruction content.
- The build script also downloads server-selected plugin files into the project.
- The manifest has no dependencies, so there is no runtime self-dependency chain.
- The lifecycle scripts themselves only delete and copy files; the network and agent update run when the replaced build command is invoked.
- The OpenAI request is confined to an explicitly invoked promo-video tool and sends only its generated prompt and image frames.
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView on unpkg · L7Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to codeplay-common@4.4.7.
See all versions of codeplay-common for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of codeplay-common@4.4.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.