codeplay-common@4.7.0
Common build scripts and files
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe lifecycle hooks perform real project-root deletion, copying, and script edits, leaving a concrete installation-time risk. The inspected behavior does not establish a block-eligible attack, so warn rather than block.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Installing codeplay-common with npm runs its preinstall and postinstall hooks.
Impact
Existing project files may be removed or overwritten and scripts may change; the agent-instruction update requires running the build script.
Mechanism
The preinstall script removes selected project paths recursively; the postinstall script copies bundled files and updates package.json scripts. A separate build-script path updates AGENTS.md and AGENTS from the package host.
AI rationale
The lifecycle hooks perform real project-root deletion, copying, and script edits, leaving a concrete installation-time risk. The inspected behavior does not establish a block-eligible attack, so warn rather than block.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/uninstall.jsscripts/sync-files.jsfiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.3.js
Network endpoints2
htmlcodeplay.com/code-play-plugin/versions.jsonhtmlcodeplay.com/code-play-plugin/
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 89.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json runs cleanup before installation and file synchronization after installation.
- The preinstall cleanup recursively removes project-root directories and deletes files matching several package-related names.
- The postinstall sync copies bundled files into the project root and edits the consumer package scripts.
- Agent instructions are fetched from the package’s own host and replaced when the build script runs; the main function calls that sync.
- The bundled build script also downloads and replaces the AGENTS.md and AGENTS directory contents.
Evidence against
- The agent-instruction update is reached through the build script, not directly through either lifecycle hook.
- The cleanup targets named build assets and the package copies its own bundled build files; the inspected code does not establish credential theft or unrelated network exfiltration.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/sync-files.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgfiles/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView file
17const { createHash } = require('node:crypto');
L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');
L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView on unpkg · L1717const { createHash } = require('node:crypto');
L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');
L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');
L20:
L21: const projectDirectory = __dirname;
L22: const capacitorConfigPath = path.join(projectDirectory, 'capacitor.config.json');
L23: const capacitorConfig = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(capacitorConfigPath, 'utf8'));
L24: const appName = String(capacitorConfig.appName || '').trim();
...
L41: const appFilePrefix = `${appUniqueId}. ${sanitizeFileNamePart(appName)}`;
L42: const playStoreDownloadUrl = `https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=${encodeURIComponent(packageId)}`;
L43: const configuredAppStoreUrl = String(iosStoreConfig.appStoreUrl || '')
...
L88: const promoCopyResultPath = path.join(temporaryDir
Findings
1 Critical8 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltafiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.3.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processfiles/generate-ai-promo-video.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installfiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.3.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedfiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.3.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/iap-install-2.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/buildCodeplay/manifestModification.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/scripts/setup-baseline-profile.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/sync-files.js
MediumNetwork
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to codeplay-common@4.7.0.
See all versions of codeplay-common for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of codeplay-common@4.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.