registry / codeplay-common / 4.7.9
codeplay-common@4.7.9
Common build scripts and files
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms an install-time setup that wires a later build to replace project agent instructions from the vendor host without a separate consent check. Since the control-surface mutation is deferred until a consumer build rather than performed by the install hook, this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Package installation followed later by running the rewritten build command.
Impact
Project agent instructions are changed without a separate consent check in the build helper; those instructions may affect later AI-agent behavior.
Mechanism
The build helper fetches a versioned archive from htmlcodeplay.com and copies its AGENTS.md and support files into the project root, replacing the existing AGENTS directory.
AI rationale
Source inspection confirms an install-time setup that wires a later build to replace project agent instructions from the vendor host without a separate consent check. Since the control-surface mutation is deferred until a consumer build rather than performed by the install hook, this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/sync-files.jsfiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.js
Network endpoints1
htmlcodeplay.com/code-play-plugin/
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The postinstall hook copies package files and rewrites the consumer project's build scripts to run the copied build helper.
- The build helper automatically fetches and installs versioned AGENTS.md instructions and support files into the consumer project root, replacing the existing AGENTS directory.
- The agent-instructions sync runs as part of the helper's main build routine without a consent check in that call path.
Evidence against
- The AGENTS.md mutation is deferred until the consumer runs the build script; the postinstall hook itself does not perform that mutation.
- The fetched agent files come from the package vendor's configured host, and the helper rejects unsafe archive paths.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/sync-files.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgfiles/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView file
17const { createHash } = require('node:crypto');
L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');
L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView on unpkg · L1717const { createHash } = require('node:crypto');
L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');
L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');
L20:
L21: const projectDirectory = __dirname;
L22: const capacitorConfigPath = path.join(projectDirectory, 'capacitor.config.json');
L23: const capacitorConfig = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(capacitorConfigPath, 'utf8'));
L24: const appName = String(capacitorConfig.appName || '').trim();
...
L41: const appFilePrefix = `${appUniqueId}. ${sanitizeFileNamePart(appName)}`;
L42: const playStoreDownloadUrl = `https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=${encodeURIComponent(packageId)}`;
L43: const configuredAppStoreUrl = String(iosStoreConfig.appStoreUrl || '')
...
L88: const promoCopyResultPath = path.join(temporaryDir
Findings
1 Critical8 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltafiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processfiles/generate-ai-promo-video.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installfiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedfiles/buildCodeplay/setSplashAnimation-1.4.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/iap-install-2.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/buildCodeplay/manifestModification.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/scripts/setup-baseline-profile.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/sync-files.js
MediumNetwork
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to codeplay-common@4.7.9.
See all versions of codeplay-common for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of codeplay-common@4.7.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.