codeplay-common@4.8.8
Common build scripts and files
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe lifecycle hooks perform project cleanup and synchronization, while the potentially risky agent-instruction replacement occurs when the consumer runs the configured build. Because that build-triggered update changes project agent guidance without a separate confirmation, warn about the capability; the inspected source does not prove an active attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The consumer runs the project build command configured by the package.
Impact
Downloaded instructions can alter guidance read by AI agents in the project; the inspected source does not show that the files are executed as code.
Mechanism
The helper checks for a newer instruction version, downloads its archive from htmlcodeplay.com, then replaces AGENTS.md and the AGENTS directory.
AI rationale
The lifecycle hooks perform project cleanup and synchronization, while the potentially risky agent-instruction replacement occurs when the consumer runs the configured build. Because that build-triggered update changes project agent guidance without a separate confirmation, warn about the capability; the inspected source does not prove an active attack.
Evidence
files/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.jsAGENTS.mdAGENTS
Network endpoints1
htmlcodeplay.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The preinstall and postinstall hooks run project cleanup and file synchronization.
- Synchronization adds a build command that runs the package’s build helper; that helper updates agent instructions during the build.
- The helper fetches versioned instructions from htmlcodeplay.com and replaces the project’s AGENTS.md and AGENTS directory.
- The archive checks reject absolute paths and entries containing .. before staging files.
Evidence against
- The agent-instruction update is reached through the project build command, not directly through either npm lifecycle hook.
- The source validates archive paths before writing staged files; the inspected code does not establish malicious payload behavior.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.preinstall = node scripts/uninstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgfiles/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView file
17const { createHash } = require('node:crypto');
L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');
L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView on unpkg · L1717const { createHash } = require('node:crypto');
L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');
L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');
L20:
L21: const projectDirectory = __dirname;
L22: const capacitorConfigPath = path.join(projectDirectory, 'capacitor.config.json');
L23: const capacitorConfig = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(capacitorConfigPath, 'utf8'));
L24: const appName = String(capacitorConfig.appName || '').trim();
...
L41: const appFilePrefix = `${appUniqueId}. ${sanitizeFileNamePart(appName)}`;
L42: const playStoreDownloadUrl = `https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=${encodeURIComponent(packageId)}`;
L43: const configuredAppStoreUrl = String(iosStoreConfig.appStoreUrl || '')
...
L88: const promoCopyResultPath = path.join(temporaryDir
Findings
1 Critical8 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltafiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processfiles/generate-ai-promo-video.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installfiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedfiles/buildCodeplay/setSplashAnimation-1.4.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/iap-install-2.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/buildCodeplay/manifestModification.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/scripts/setup-baseline-profile.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/sync-files.js
MediumNetwork
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to codeplay-common@4.8.8.
See all versions of codeplay-common for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of codeplay-common@4.8.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.