registry / AI-agent capability abuse / codeplay-common / 4.8.9

codeplay-common@4.8.9

Common build scripts and files

AI Security Review

scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package automatically wires a build-time updater that replaces existing project agent instructions without consent. Because this mutation runs through a user-invoked build rather than an npm install hook, the evidence supports a warning rather than a block.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The consumer runs the build command wired by the postinstall helper.

Impact

Existing project agent instructions may be replaced by publisher-controlled instructions, affecting later AI-agent behavior. The inspected source does not establish malicious archive contents.

Mechanism

The build fetches a newer instruction archive, removes the existing AGENTS directory, and copies the archive's AGENTS.md and supporting files into the project root without requesting consent.

AI rationale

Evidence

files/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.jsscripts/sync-files.jspackage.jsonAGENTS.mdAGENTS/

Network endpoints2

htmlcodeplay.com/code-play-plugin/versions.jsonhtmlcodeplay.com/code-play-plugin/${zipName}

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The manifest declares automatic preinstall and postinstall hooks; the postinstall helper copies package files into the consumer project root.
The postinstall helper rewrites the consumer build command to run a bundled build script.
The build script targets project-root AGENTS.md and AGENTS/ and updates them when the publisher reports a newer version.
The update fetches agent instruction archives from the package publisher's server.
The build directly awaits the updater, which removes the existing AGENTS directory and copies the downloaded instruction files into the project root without a consent prompt.

Evidence against

The agent-instruction update runs through the consumer's build command, not directly through the npm lifecycle hooks.
The update checks for a newer version and uses a package-aligned server; the inspected code does not establish malicious instruction content.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystem

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/sync-files.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1// Generate an English app promo video from the original Android capture.

2// Usage: node generate-ai-promo-video.js

3// Optional: node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout dynamic

4// Optional: node generate-ai-promo-video.js --input path/to/source.mp4 --output path/to/output.mp4

6// node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout dynamic

7// node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout split

8// node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout centered

9// node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout floating

10// node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout cinematic

11// node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout mixed

12// node generate-ai-promo-video.js --layout random

15const fs = require('node:fs');

16const path = require('node:path');

17const { createHash } = require('node:crypto');

18const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');

19const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView on unpkg · L17

21const projectDirectory = __dirname;

22const capacitorConfigPath = path.join(projectDirectory, 'capacitor.config.json');

23const capacitorConfig = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(capacitorConfigPath, 'utf8'));

24const appName = String(capacitorConfig.appName || '').trim();

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView on unpkg · L17

25const appUniqueId = String(capacitorConfig.android?.APP_UNIQUE_ID ?? '').trim();

26const packageId = String(capacitorConfig.appId || '').trim();

27const iosStoreConfigPath = path.join(projectDirectory, 'Auto-AI-Video', 'ios-store-config.json');

28let iosStoreConfig = {};

29if (fs.existsSync(iosStoreConfigPath)) {

30 try {

31 iosStoreConfig = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(iosStoreConfigPath, 'utf8'));

32 } catch {

33 iosStoreConfig = {};

34 }

35}

37if (!appName) throw new Error('capacitor.config.json is missing appName.');

scripts/sync-files.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1const fs = require("fs");

2const path = require("path");

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/sync-files.jsView on unpkg · L1

files/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.jsView file

Lines 117-157javascript

117 { pattern: /IAP-(\d+\.\d+)$/, minVersion: '2.8', isFolder: true , required: true, baseDir: 'js/Ads',mandatoryUpdate: true },

118 { pattern

files/buildCodeplay/setSplashAnimation-1.4.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

files/buildCodeplay/setSplashAnimation-1.4.jsView on unpkg

files/iap-install-2.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = codeplay-common@4.4.6 matchedPath = files/iap-install-2.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y29kZXBsYXktY29tbW9u:4.4.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

files/iap-install-2.jsView on unpkg

files/buildCodeplay/manifestModification.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = codeplay-common@4.4.6 matchedPath = [redacted].js matchedIdentity = npm:Y29kZXBsYXktY29tbW9u:4.4.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

files/buildCodeplay/manifestModification.jsView on unpkg

files/scripts/setup-baseline-profile.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = codeplay-common@4.4.6 matchedPath = files/scripts/setup-baseline-profile.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y29kZXBsYXktY29tbW9u:4.4.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

files/scripts/setup-baseline-profile.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/sync-files.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView file

17const { createHash } = require('node:crypto'); L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

files/generate-ai-promo-video.jsView on unpkg · L17

17const { createHash } = require('node:crypto'); L18: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L19: const { createInterface } = require('node:readline/promises'); L20: L21: const projectDirectory = __dirname; L22: const capacitorConfigPath = path.join(projectDirectory, 'capacitor.config.json'); L23: const capacitorConfig = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(capacitorConfigPath, 'utf8')); L24: const appName = String(capacitorConfig.appName || '').trim(); ... L41: const appFilePrefix = `${appUniqueId}. ${sanitizeFileNamePart(appName)}`; L42: const playStoreDownloadUrl = `https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=${encodeURIComponent(packageId)}`; L43: const configuredAppStoreUrl = String(iosStoreConfig.appStoreUrl || '') ... L88: const promoCopyResultPath = path.join(temporaryDir

Findings

1 Critical8 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltafiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processfiles/generate-ai-promo-video.js

HighShell

HighRuntime Package Installfiles/buildCodeplay/codeplayBeforeBuild-6.4.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedfiles/buildCodeplay/setSplashAnimation-1.4.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/iap-install-2.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/buildCodeplay/manifestModification.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similarityfiles/scripts/setup-baseline-profile.js

MediumDynamic Requirescripts/sync-files.js

MediumNetwork

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to codeplay-common@4.8.9.

See all versions of codeplay-common for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of codeplay-common@4.8.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-19 10:31:13.643Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.