codex-supermemory@1.0.20
Persistent memory for OpenAI Codex CLI — powered by Supermemory
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package implements an explicit CLI installation that registers its memory hooks in Codex configuration, which is a guarded agent capability. The manifest shows no npm install lifecycle hook, and the inspected source does not establish malicious behavior warranting a block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs the package CLI with the install command.
Impact
Subsequent Codex sessions can invoke the package hooks for memory retrieval and capture.
Mechanism
The installer adds package-owned commands to Codex session, prompt, tool, and stop hooks and writes the hook configuration.
AI rationale
The package implements an explicit CLI installation that registers its memory hooks in Codex configuration, which is a guarded agent capability. The manifest shows no npm install lifecycle hook, and the inspected source does not establish malicious behavior warranting a block.
Evidence
dist/cli.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI registers memory hooks in Codex configuration when its install command is explicitly invoked.
- The package exposes install, uninstall, and status commands through its CLI entrypoint.
Evidence against
- The manifest lists build, typecheck, and test scripts; it shows no npm install lifecycle hook.
- The session-start hook retrieves profile data through the package client as part of its memory feature.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/hooks/recall.jsView file
212var import_node_crypto = require("node:crypto");
L213: var import_node_child_process = require("node:child_process");
L214: var import_node_fs3 = require("node:fs");
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/hooks/recall.jsView on unpkg · L212dist/hooks/session-start.jsView file
40// src/services/auth.ts
L41: var import_node_http = require("node:http");
L42: var import_node_fs = require("node:fs");
...
L50: // src/services/openUrl.ts
L51: var import_node_child_process = require("node:child_process");
L52: function run(command, args) {
...
L64: }
L65: if (process.platform === "win32") {
L66: try {
...
L70: }
L71: await run("cmd.exe", ["/c", "start", '""', href]);
L72: return;
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/hooks/session-start.jsView on unpkg · L4070
Findings
1 Critical5 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/hooks/session-start.js
HighChild Processdist/hooks/recall.js
HighShelldist/hooks/session-start.js
HighEvaldist/cli.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/hooks/session-start.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/hooks/session-start.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to codex-supermemory@1.0.20.
See all versions of codex-supermemory for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of codex-supermemory@1.0.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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