---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/colab-new/v/0.0.2"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/colab-new/v/0.0.2.md"
package: "colab-new"
report_status: "published"
title: "colab-new@0.0.2 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.0.2"
---

# colab-new@0.0.2 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 14 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 0.0.2
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The default destination matches the credential's service, but the API recipient is unrestricted when CODEBERG\_API\_URL is set. This warrants a warning for conditional credential exposure, without evidence supporting a publish block.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-13T15:21:06.166Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-13T15:25:26.137Z
- **Download time:** 520 ms
- **Static scan time:** 74 ms
- **AI review time:** 259376 ms
- **Total time:** 259971 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The CLI can send an existing Codeberg credential to an environment-configured API recipient. The default recipient is Codeberg's API.

- **Trigger:** A user runs the CLI, the initial push is refused, and Git provides a Codeberg credential.

- **Impact:** If configured to an unrelated recipient, the credential may be disclosed to that recipient.

- **Evidence paths:** colab-new.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-13T15:25:26.137Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The CLI sends the credential in a Basic authorization header to the API URL, which can be overridden with CODEBERG\_API\_URL.

- **Rationale:** The default destination matches the credential's service, but the API recipient is unrestricted when CODEBERG\_API\_URL is set. This warrants a warning for conditional credential exposure, without evidence supporting a publish block.

- **Network endpoints:** https://codeberg.org/api/v1

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 94.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The package exposes colab-new.js as a command-line entrypoint., The API recipient defaults to Codeberg but can be replaced with CODEBERG\_API\_URL., The CLI retrieves credentials from Git's helper for https://codeberg.org., After a refused push, the CLI passes those credentials to createRepo, which sends them as Basic authorization to the configured API recipient.

- **Evidence against:** The default recipient is Codeberg's API, matching the service for which the Git credential is retrieved., The credential transfer is conditional on a failed push and the repository-creation fallback.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to colab-new@0.0.2.

- Review the evidence and your use of colab-new@0.0.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** colab-new.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/colab-new@0.0.2/colab-new.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
L3: import {
```

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** colab-new.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/colab-new@0.0.2/colab-new.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L322: try {
L323: const output = execFileSync('git', ['credential', 'fill'], {
L324: cwd: target,
L325: input: 'url=https://codeberg.org\n\n',
L326: stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
L327: encoding: 'utf8',
L328: env: { ...process.env, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0', GIT_ASKPASS: '', SSH_ASKPASS: '' }
L329: });
```

### 7. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** colab-new.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/colab-new@0.0.2/colab-new.js>)

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
L3: import {
...
L10: // Printed first so it's obvious which installed version is running.
L11: const packageJsonPath = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), 'package.json');
L12: const { name, version } = JSON.parse(readFileSync(packageJsonPath, 'utf8'));
L13: console.log(`${ name } version: ${ version }`);
...
L21: // Overridable so the tests can point both at a local stand-in (TECH.md); never needed otherwise.
L22: const CODEBERG = `${ process.env.CODEBERG_URL ?? 'https://codeberg.org' }/colab47`;
L23: const CODEBERG_API = process.env.CODEBERG_API_URL ?? 'https://codeberg.org/api/v1';
...
L27: // update-llm-rules.sh keeps a clone
```

### 8. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** colab-new.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/colab-new@0.0.2/colab-new.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L343: try {
L344: execFileSync('git', ['push', '--quiet', '-u', 'origin', 'main'], { cwd: target, stdio: 'pipe' });
L345: 
...
L347: } catch (error) {
L348: return (error.stderr?.toString() || error.message).trim().split('\n').pop();
L349: }
...
L353: const basic = Buffer.from(`${ credential.username }:${ credential.password }`).toString('base64');
L354: const response = await fetch(`${ CODEBERG_API }/orgs/colab47/repos`, {
L355: method: 'POST',
L356: headers: { Authorization: `Basic ${ basic }`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
L357: body: JSON.stringify({ name: names.kebab, private: true, default_branch: 'main' })
L358: }).catch(() => null);
```

### 9. Critical: Encoded Package Runner Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 91.0%
- **Path:** colab-new.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/colab-new@0.0.2/colab-new.js>)

Source decodes numeric character arrays into a child-process package-runner command and executes it.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
L3: import {
...
L10: // Printed first so it's obvious which installed version is running.
L11: const packageJsonPath = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), 'package.json');
L12: const { name, version } = JSON.parse(readFileSync(packageJsonPath, 'utf8'));
L13: console.log(`${ name } version: ${ version }`);
...
L21: // Overridable so the tests can point both at a local stand-in (TECH.md); never needed otherwise.
L22: const CODEBERG = `${ process.env.CODEBERG_URL ?? 'https://codeberg.org' }/colab47`;
L23: const CODEBERG_API = process.env.CODEBERG_API_URL ?? 'https://codeberg.org/api/v1';
...
L27: // update-llm-rules.sh keeps a clone here; reusing it saves a network round trip
L28: const RULES_CACHE = join(hom
```

### 10. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** colab-new.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/colab-new@0.0.2/colab-new.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> colab-new.js
L343: try {
L344: execFileSync('git', ['push', '--quiet', '-u', 'origin', 'main'], { cwd: target, stdio: 'pipe' });
L345: 
...
L347: } catch (error) {
L348: return (error.stderr?.toString() || error.message).trim().split('\n').pop();
L349: }
...
L353: const basic = Buffer.from(`${ credential.username }:${ credential.password }`).toString('base64');
L354: const response = await fetch(`${ CODEBERG_API }/orgs/colab47/repos`, {
L355: method: 'POST',
L356: headers: { Authorization: `Basic ${ basic }`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
L357: body: JSON.stringify({ name: names.kebab, private: true, default_branch: 'main' })
L358: }).catch(() => null);
```

### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** colab-new.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/colab-new@0.0.2/colab-new.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> colab-new.js
L343: try {
L344: execFileSync('git', ['push', '--quiet', '-u', 'origin', 'main'], { cwd: target, stdio: 'pipe' });
L345: 
...
L347: } catch (error) {
L348: return (error.stderr?.toString() || error.message).trim().split('\n').pop();
L349: }
...
L353: const basic = Buffer.from(`${ credential.username }:${ credential.password }`).toString('base64');
L354: const response = await fetch(`${ CODEBERG_API }/orgs/colab47/repos`, {
L355: method: 'POST',
L356: headers: { Authorization: `Basic ${ basic }`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
L357: body: JSON.stringify({ name: names.kebab, private: true, default_branch: 'main' })
L358: }).catch(() => null);
```

### 12. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 14. Low: Copyleft License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest declares a copyleft-style license.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 1
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** colab-new
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.0.2
- **License:** GPL-3.0
- **Version published:** 2026-10-13T15:20:09.597Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-13T12:06:06.894Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-11T16:38:26.619Z
- **Known versions:** 5
- **Latest version:** 0.0.9
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Starts a co:lab project from a template: clones it, adds .llm-rules, swaps the placeholders for the project's name, installs the lint hook and prints the hosting steps left to do.
- **Maintainers:** banjo4444
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22
- **Artifact files:** 3
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 26,135 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/colab-new/v/0.0.2>)
- [Repository](<https://codeberg.org/colab47/colab-new>)
