--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/create-chemx" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/create-chemx/v/26.9.21-432.md" package: "create-chemx" report_status: "published" title: "create-chemx@26.9.21-432 npm security report" verdict: "policy_finding" version: "26.9.21-432" --- # create-chemx@26.9.21-432 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. AI coding tools may load the registered server and expose its supported operations through a single gateway. - **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding - **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 26.9.21-432 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The active postinstall lifecycle writes MCP configuration for consumer AI tools without an opt-in prompt. The resulting gateway consolidates operations and is described as avoiding separate approval for each operation, so this meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface block rule. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-12T08:14:32.526Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-12T08:15:22.516Z - **Download time:** 517 ms - **Static scan time:** 1573 ms - **AI review time:** 47899 ms - **Total time:** 49990 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installation automatically adds an MCP server entry to consumer project configuration for AI coding tools. The server exposes a multi-operation gateway that reduces separate per-operation approval prompts. - **Trigger:** Installing the package through npm, which runs its postinstall lifecycle script. - **Impact:** AI coding tools may load the registered server and expose its supported operations through a single gateway. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, cli/postinstall.js, cli/mcp/installer.js, cli/mcp/manifests.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T08:15:22.516Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The lifecycle script invokes the MCP installer, which writes Cursor and VS Code MCP configuration in the consumer project without prompting for setup consent. - **Attack narrative:** The npm postinstall path automatically mutates consumer AI-tool configuration. The added MCP server presents many operations through one gateway; the manifest explicitly describes avoiding separate per-operation approval. This supports blocking under the policy for unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. - **Rationale:** The active postinstall lifecycle writes MCP configuration for consumer AI tools without an opt-in prompt. The resulting gateway consolidates operations and is described as avoiding separate approval for each operation, so this meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface block rule. - **Files touched:** .cursor/mcp.json, .vscode/mcp.json, ~/.gemini/config/mcp\_config.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for policy risk:** The package manifest runs cli/postinstall.js after installation., Postinstall calls the MCP installer for the consumer project without an interactive consent step., The MCP installer writes Cursor and VS Code MCP configuration and registers the package’s server., The MCP tool manifest says its single gateway avoids separate approval for each sub-operation., The installer also has agent-search and pillars configuration paths, but these are separate from the postinstall chain. - **Evidence against:** The postinstall skips when installing inside the starter-kit itself., The Antigravity user-level configuration is only changed when its configuration directory already exists. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to create-chemx@26.9.21-432. - Avoid installing create-chemx@26.9.21-432. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. Critical: Critical Secret - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** cli/errors/errors.spec.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27 ``` ### 6. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** cli/audit-preflight-git.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: import fs from 'node:fs'; L2: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L3: ``` ### 7. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** cli/build/executor.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: const child = spawn(command, { L12: shell: true, L13: cwd, ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** cli/license.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: import os from 'node:os'; L4: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L5: import { ... L17: L18: export const API_BASE = process.env.CHEMICAL_X_API_URL || 'https://chemicalx.xophz.com'; L19: export const GATEKEEPER_API_URL = process.env.COMPASS_GATEKEEPER_URL || 'https://mycompassconsulting.com/wp-json/compass/v1/gatekeeper'; ``` ### 12. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** cli/mcp/installer.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => { L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} }; L22: ... L30: L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers && typeof parsed.mcpServers === 'object'); L32: if (!hasMcpServersObject) { L33: parsed.mcpServers = {}; L34: } L35: L36: parsed.mcpServers[SERVER_KEY] = serverDef; L37: return JSON.stringify(parsed, null, 2) + '\n'; ... L90: const cursorDir = path.join(resolvedTarget, '.cursor'); Write operation from cli/mcp/installer.js: L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => { L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} }; L22: ... L30: L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers & ``` ### 13. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** cli/pillars-wizard.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. st pick = usegum ? gumchoose(choices, 'select architectural pillars configuration') : await promptquestion('select pillars: [1=recommended, 2=strict, 3=custom, 4=minimal, 5=none] (default: 1): '); if (pick && (pick.startswith('2.') || pick === '2')) { selectedpresetkey = 'strict'; selectedpillarids = [...pillar_presets.strict.pillars]; } else if (pick && (pick.startswith('3.') || pick === '3')) { selectedpresetkey = 'custom'; for (const pillar of pillars) { const defaultchoice = pillar_presets.recommended.pillars.includes(pillar.id) ? 'y/n' : 'y/n'; const isdefaultyes = defaultchoice === 'y/n'; const answer = a ``` ### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 15. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 16. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/pre-commit.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = scripts/pre-commit.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 5174 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 18. Critical: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** cli/errors/errors.spec.js - **Public source:** [View source]() GitHub personal access token in cli/errors/errors.spec.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 5 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 6 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 5 ### Published dependency entries - @babel/parser ^7.29.8 (Dependency) - @babel/traverse ^7.29.8 (Dependency) - @babel/types ^7.29.8 (Dependency) - react ^18.3.1 (Dependency) - react-dom ^18.3.1 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** create-chemx - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 26.9.21-432 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-21T11:06:16.850Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-09-09T11:18:47.129Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-21T17:29:03.098Z - **Known versions:** 42 - **Latest version:** 26.10.19-530 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Chemical X Protocol: Private drop-in architecture starter kit and capsule generator - **Artifact files:** 283 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,156,878 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()