create-zuplo-api@7.11.4
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe configurable endpoint is not restricted to the token’s intended service, and the source sends the stored token to it during server project setup. This is conditional credential exposure warranting a warning, not evidence of a default malicious transfer.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Server project creation or linking is enabled by a flag or by accepting the CLI prompt, and a Zuplo token is available locally.
Impact
If the endpoint is set to an unrelated host, that host receives the Zuplo access token. The source does not establish that this happens with the default endpoint.
Mechanism
Account and deployment lookups build request URLs from `ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT` and attach the stored token as a Bearer credential; the source does not validate the destination host.
AI rationale
The configurable endpoint is not restricted to the token’s intended service, and the source sends the stored token to it during server project setup. This is conditional credential exposure warranting a warning, not evidence of a default malicious transfer.
Evidence
dist/index.js
Network endpoints1
dev.zuplo.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- `dist/index.js` reads a Zuplo access token from local auth storage and allows `ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT` to replace the default `https://dev.zuplo.com`.
- Account and deployment lookup requests send that token as a Bearer credential to URLs built from the configured endpoint, without a host allowlist.
- The requests occur during server project creation or linking, which is activated by server project flags or an affirmative CLI prompt.
- The indicated agent setup location maps settings to project paths; the CLI asks which agents to configure, making that a separate user-selected setup.
- `package.json` exposes `dist/index.js` as a CLI and lists no install lifecycle hook.
Evidence against
- The token requests support Zuplo account and deployment lookups, and the default endpoint is Zuplo’s developer API.
- The credential exposure depends on an operator setting the endpoint override to an unrelated host; the inspected source does not show covert token transfer.
- Agent configuration is project-scoped and separately selected through the CLI.
Behavioral surface
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.11.4.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.11.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.