create-zuplo-api@7.11.5
Create Zuplo API with one command
AI Security Review
scanned 21d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source confirms that an endpoint override can redirect an existing Zuplo access token during user-enabled server-project setup, so this warrants a conditional credential-exposure warning. The default is the package-aligned Zuplo service, and the source does not establish malicious intent or an actual disclosure.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The user enables server-project setup, and an access token is available in the Zuplo auth file.
Impact
A configured recipient could receive the user's Zuplo access token. The source does not show that an override is set or that a token was actually disclosed.
Mechanism
The CLI uses the configured endpoint as the base for account and deployment requests and places the token in the Bearer authorization header without checking the destination host.
AI rationale
The source confirms that an endpoint override can redirect an existing Zuplo access token during user-enabled server-project setup, so this warrants a conditional credential-exposure warning. The default is the package-aligned Zuplo service, and the source does not establish malicious intent or an actual disclosure.
Evidence
dist/index.js
Network endpoints1
dev.zuplo.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI reads an existing Zuplo access token and lets ZUPLO_DEVELOPER_API_ENDPOINT replace its default service endpoint.
- It sends that token as Bearer authorization to account and deployment requests built from the configured endpoint; no destination allowlist is present in those requests.
- The credential requests are reached through server-project setup, which runs only when that option is enabled; the CLI asks whether to create a matching Zuplo project.
- Agent setup is separately selected and writes configuration into the new project; the manifest has no install lifecycle hook.
- The default credential recipient is https://dev.zuplo.com, so the exposure depends on an endpoint override.
Evidence against
- The package manifest exposes a CLI and lists development, build, and test scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The source does not establish that an endpoint override is set or that a token was sent to an unrelated recipient.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVars
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: missingProperty: ${g},
L7: depsCount: ${u},
L8: deps: ${
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: (()=>{var t={7213:(t,u,p)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(u,"__esModule",{value:true});u.createFileSystemAdapter=u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADAPTER=void 0;const m=p(9896);u.FILE_SYSTEM_ADA...
L3: || (${w} == "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g})`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"integer":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null
L4: || (${w} === "string" && ${g} && ${g} == +${g} && !(${g} % 1))`).assign(E,(0,b._)`+${g}`);return;case"boolean":m.elseIf((0,b._)`${g} === "false" || ${g} === 0 || ${g} === null`).as...
L5: || ${w} === "boolean" || ${g} === null`).assign(E,(0,b._)`[${g}]`)}}}function assignParentData({gen:t,parentData:u,parentDataProperty:p},m){t.if((0,b._)`${u} !== undefined`,(()=>t....
L6: m
Findings
2 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to create-zuplo-api@7.11.5.
See all versions of create-zuplo-api for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of create-zuplo-api@7.11.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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